One thing that confused me was the assumption at various points that the oracle is going to pay out the entire surplus generated. That’ll get the most projects done, but it will have bad results because you’ll have spent the entire surplus on charity yachts.
The oracle should be paying out what it takes to get projects done. Not in the sense of labor theory of value, I mean that if you are having trouble attracting projects, payouts should go up, and if you have lots of competition for funding, payouts should go down.
This is actually a lot like a monopsony situation, where you can have unemployment (analogous to net-positive projects that don’t get done) because the monopsonistic employer has a hard time paying those last few people what they want without having to raise wages for everyone else, eating into their surplus.
I agree it’s a problem for the entire surplus to go to the seller. But that problem isn’t impactful people getting rich. It’s that if the certs are too expensive there’ll be too few buyers to clear the market. So I agree that payouts should probably be tuneable. If you want the actual impact of a project to still be known, then you could have the “percent of impact purchased” be the tuneable parameter, if buyers aren’t too sensitive to it.
One thing that confused me was the assumption at various points that the oracle is going to pay out the entire surplus generated. That’ll get the most projects done, but it will have bad results because you’ll have spent the entire surplus on charity yachts.
The oracle should be paying out what it takes to get projects done. Not in the sense of labor theory of value, I mean that if you are having trouble attracting projects, payouts should go up, and if you have lots of competition for funding, payouts should go down.
This is actually a lot like a monopsony situation, where you can have unemployment (analogous to net-positive projects that don’t get done) because the monopsonistic employer has a hard time paying those last few people what they want without having to raise wages for everyone else, eating into their surplus.
I agree it’s a problem for the entire surplus to go to the seller. But that problem isn’t impactful people getting rich. It’s that if the certs are too expensive there’ll be too few buyers to clear the market. So I agree that payouts should probably be tuneable. If you want the actual impact of a project to still be known, then you could have the “percent of impact purchased” be the tuneable parameter, if buyers aren’t too sensitive to it.