This is very interesting! I’m excited to see connections drawn between AI safety and the law / philosophy of law. It seems there are a lot of fruitful insights to be had.
You write,
The rules of Evidence have evolved over long experience with high-stakes debates, so their substantive findings on the types of arguments that prove problematic for truth-seeking are relevant to Debate.
Can you elaborate a bit on this?
I don’t know anything about the history of these rules about evidence. But why think that over this history, these rules have trended towards truth-seeking per se? I wouldn’t be surprised if the rules have evolved to better serve the purposes of the legal system over time, but presumably the relationship between this end and truth-seeking is quite complex. Also, people changing the rules could be mistaken about what sorts of evidence do in fact tend to lead to wrong decisions.
I think all of this is compatible with your claim. But I’d like to hear more!
I think it is accurate to say that the rules of evidence have generally aimed for truth-seeking per se. That is their stated goal, and it generally explains the liberal standard for admission (relevance, which is a very low bar and tracks Bayesian epistemology well), the even more liberal standards for discovery, and most of the admissibility exceptions (which are generally explainable by humans’ imperfect Bayesianism).
You’re definitely right that the legal system as a whole has many goals other than truth-seeking. However, those other goals are generally advanced through other aspects of the justice system. As an example, finality is a goal of the legal system, and is advanced through, among other things, statutes of limitations and repose. Similarly, the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard for criminal conviction is in some sense contrary to truth-seeking but advances the policy preference for underpunishment over overpunishment.
You’re also right that there are some exceptions to this within evidence law itself, but not many. For example, the attorney–client privilege exists not to facilitate truth-seeking, but to protect the attorney–client relationship. Similarly, the spousal privileges exist to protect the marital relationship. (Precisely because such privileges are contrary to truth-seeking, they are interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir. 1987)). And of course, some rules of evidence have both truth-seeking and other policy rationales. Still, on the whole and in general, the rules of evidence are aimed towards truth.
This is very interesting! I’m excited to see connections drawn between AI safety and the law / philosophy of law. It seems there are a lot of fruitful insights to be had.
You write,
Can you elaborate a bit on this?
I don’t know anything about the history of these rules about evidence. But why think that over this history, these rules have trended towards truth-seeking per se? I wouldn’t be surprised if the rules have evolved to better serve the purposes of the legal system over time, but presumably the relationship between this end and truth-seeking is quite complex. Also, people changing the rules could be mistaken about what sorts of evidence do in fact tend to lead to wrong decisions.
I think all of this is compatible with your claim. But I’d like to hear more!
Thanks for this very thoughtful comment!
I think it is accurate to say that the rules of evidence have generally aimed for truth-seeking per se. That is their stated goal, and it generally explains the liberal standard for admission (relevance, which is a very low bar and tracks Bayesian epistemology well), the even more liberal standards for discovery, and most of the admissibility exceptions (which are generally explainable by humans’ imperfect Bayesianism).
You’re definitely right that the legal system as a whole has many goals other than truth-seeking. However, those other goals are generally advanced through other aspects of the justice system. As an example, finality is a goal of the legal system, and is advanced through, among other things, statutes of limitations and repose. Similarly, the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard for criminal conviction is in some sense contrary to truth-seeking but advances the policy preference for underpunishment over overpunishment.
You’re also right that there are some exceptions to this within evidence law itself, but not many. For example, the attorney–client privilege exists not to facilitate truth-seeking, but to protect the attorney–client relationship. Similarly, the spousal privileges exist to protect the marital relationship. (Precisely because such privileges are contrary to truth-seeking, they are interpreted narrowly. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th Cir. 1987)). And of course, some rules of evidence have both truth-seeking and other policy rationales. Still, on the whole and in general, the rules of evidence are aimed towards truth.