What is your overall probability that we will, in this century, see progress in artificial intelligence that is at least as transformative as the industrial revolution?
What is your probability for the more modest claim that AI will be at least as transformative as, say, electricity or railroads?
What is your overall probability that we will, in this century, see progress in artificial intelligence that is at least as transformative as the industrial revolution?
I think this is a little tricky. The main way in which the Industrial Revolution was unusually transformative is that, over the course of the IR, there were apparently unusually large pivots in several important trendlines. Most notably, GDP-per-capita began to increase at a consistently much higher rate. In more concrete terms, though, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries probably included even greater technological transformations.
From David Weil’s growth textbook (pg. 265-266):
Given these two observations—that growth during the Industrial Revolution was not particularly fast and that growth did not slow down when the Industrial Revolution ended—what was really so revolutionary about the period? There are two answers. First, the technologies introduced during the Industrial Revolution were indeed revolutionary, but their immediate impact on economic growth was small because they were initially confined to a few industries. More significantly, the Industrial Revolution was a beginning. Rapid technological change, the replacement of old production processes with new ones, the continuous introduction of new goods—all of these processes that we take for granted today got their start during the Industrial Revolution. Although the actual growth rates achieved during this period do not look revolutionary in retrospect, the pattern of continual growth that began then was indeed revolutionary in contrast to what had come before.
I think it’s a bit unclear, then, how to think about AI progress that’s at least as transformative as the IR. If economic growth rates radically increase in the future, then we might apply the label “transformative AI” to the the period where the change in growth rates becomes clear. But it’s also possible that growth rates won’t ultimately go up that much. Maybe the trend in the labor force participation rate is the one to look at, since there’s a good chance it will eventually decline to nearly zero; but it’s also possible the decline will be really protracted, without a particularly clean pivot.
None of this is an answer to your question, of course. (I will probably circle back and try to give you a probability later.) But I am sort of wary of “transformative AI” as a forecasting target; if I was somehow given access to a video recording of the future of AI, I think it’s possible I would have a lot of trouble labeling the decade where “AI progress as transformative as the Industrial Revolution” has been achieved.
What is your probability for the more modest claim that AI will be at least as transformative as, say, electricity or railroads?
Also a little bit tricky, partly because electricity underlies AI. As one operationalization, then, suppose we were to ask an economist in 2100: “Do you think that the counterfactual contribution of AI to American productivity growth between 2010 and 2100 was at least as large as the counterfactual contribution of electricity to American productivity growth between 1900 and 1940?” I think that the economist would probably agree—let’s say, 50% < p < 75% -- but I don’t have a very principled reason for thinking this and might change my mind if I thought a bit more.
I agree that it’s tricky, and am quite worried about how the framings we use may bias our views on the future of AI. I like the GDP/productivity growth perspective but feel free to answer the same questions for your preferred operationalisation.
Another possible framing: given a crystal ball showing the future, how likely is it that people would generally say that AI is the most important thing that happens this century?
As one operationalization, then, suppose we were to ask an economist in 2100: “Do you think that the counterfactual contribution of AI to American productivity growth between 2010 and 2100 was at least as large as the counterfactual contribution of electricity to American productivity growth between 1900 and 1940?” I think that the economist would probably agree—let’s say, 50% < p < 75% -- but I don’t have a very principled reason for thinking this and might change my mind if I thought a bit more.
Interesting. So you generally expect (well, with 50-75% probability) AI to become a significantly bigger deal, in terms of productivity growth, than it is now? I have not looked into this in detail but my understanding is that the contribution of AI to productivity growth right now is very small (and less than electricity).
If yes, what do you think causes this acceleration? It could simply be that AI is early-stage right now, akin to electricity in 1900 or earlier, and the large productivity gains arise when key innovations diffuse through society on a large scale. (However, many forms of AI are already widespread.) Or it could be that progress in AI itself accelerates, or perhaps linear progress in something like “general intelligence” translates to super-linear impact on productivity.
Interesting. So you generally expect (well, with 50-75% probability) AI to become a significantly bigger deal, in terms of productivity growth, than it is now? I have not looked into this in detail but my understanding is that the contribution of AI to productivity growth right now is very small (and less than electricity).
If yes, what do you think causes this acceleration? It could simply be that AI is early-stage right now, akin to electricity in 1900 or earlier, and the large productivity gains arise when key innovations diffuse through society on a large scale. (However, many forms of AI are already widespread.) Or it could be that progress in AI itself accelerates, or perhaps linear progress in something like “general intelligence” translates to super-linear impact on productivity.
I mostly have in mind the idea that AI is “early-stage,” as you say. The thought is that “general purpose technologies” (GPTs) like electricity, the steam engine, the computer, and (probably) AI tend to have very delayed effects.
For example, there was really major progress in computing in the middle of the 20th century, and lots of really major invents throughout the 70s and 80s, but computers didn’t have a noticeable impact on productivity growth until the 90s. The first serious electric motors were developed in the mid-19th century, but electricity didn’t have a big impact on productivity until the early 20th. There was also a big lag associated with steam power; it didn’t really matter until the middle of the 19th century, even though the first steam engines were developed centuries earlier.
So if AI takes several decades to have a large economic impact, this would be consistent with analagous cases from history. It can take a long time for the technology to improve, for engineers to get trained up, for complementary inventions to be developed, for useful infrastructure to be built, for organizational structures to get redesigned around the technology, etc. I don’t think it’d be very surprising if 80 years was enough for a lot of really major changes to happen, especially since the “time to impact” for GPTs seems to be shrinking over time.
Then I’m also factoring in the additional possibility that there will be some unusually dramatic acceleration, which is distinguishes AI from most earlier GPTs.
That seems plausible and is also consistent with Amara’s law (the idea that the impact of technology is often overestimated in the short run and underestimated in the long run).
I’m curious how likely you think it is that productivity growth will be significantly higher (i.e. levels at least comparable with electricity) for any reason, not just AI. I wouldn’t give this much more than 50%, as there is also some evidence that stagnation is on the cards (see e.g. 1, 2). But that would mean that you’re confident that the cause of higher productivity growth, assuming that this happens, would be AI? (Rather than, say, synthetic biotechnology, or genetic engineering, or some other technological advance, or some social change resulting in more optimisation for productivity.)
While AI is perhaps the most plausible single candidate, it’s still quite unclear, so I’d maybe say it’s 25-30% likely that AI in particular will cause significantly higher levels of productivity growth this century.
What is your overall probability that we will, in this century, see progress in artificial intelligence that is at least as transformative as the industrial revolution?
What is your probability for the more modest claim that AI will be at least as transformative as, say, electricity or railroads?
I think this is a little tricky. The main way in which the Industrial Revolution was unusually transformative is that, over the course of the IR, there were apparently unusually large pivots in several important trendlines. Most notably, GDP-per-capita began to increase at a consistently much higher rate. In more concrete terms, though, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries probably included even greater technological transformations.
From David Weil’s growth textbook (pg. 265-266):
I think it’s a bit unclear, then, how to think about AI progress that’s at least as transformative as the IR. If economic growth rates radically increase in the future, then we might apply the label “transformative AI” to the the period where the change in growth rates becomes clear. But it’s also possible that growth rates won’t ultimately go up that much. Maybe the trend in the labor force participation rate is the one to look at, since there’s a good chance it will eventually decline to nearly zero; but it’s also possible the decline will be really protracted, without a particularly clean pivot.
None of this is an answer to your question, of course. (I will probably circle back and try to give you a probability later.) But I am sort of wary of “transformative AI” as a forecasting target; if I was somehow given access to a video recording of the future of AI, I think it’s possible I would have a lot of trouble labeling the decade where “AI progress as transformative as the Industrial Revolution” has been achieved.
Also a little bit tricky, partly because electricity underlies AI. As one operationalization, then, suppose we were to ask an economist in 2100: “Do you think that the counterfactual contribution of AI to American productivity growth between 2010 and 2100 was at least as large as the counterfactual contribution of electricity to American productivity growth between 1900 and 1940?” I think that the economist would probably agree—let’s say, 50% < p < 75% -- but I don’t have a very principled reason for thinking this and might change my mind if I thought a bit more.
I agree that it’s tricky, and am quite worried about how the framings we use may bias our views on the future of AI. I like the GDP/productivity growth perspective but feel free to answer the same questions for your preferred operationalisation.
Another possible framing: given a crystal ball showing the future, how likely is it that people would generally say that AI is the most important thing that happens this century?
Interesting. So you generally expect (well, with 50-75% probability) AI to become a significantly bigger deal, in terms of productivity growth, than it is now? I have not looked into this in detail but my understanding is that the contribution of AI to productivity growth right now is very small (and less than electricity).
If yes, what do you think causes this acceleration? It could simply be that AI is early-stage right now, akin to electricity in 1900 or earlier, and the large productivity gains arise when key innovations diffuse through society on a large scale. (However, many forms of AI are already widespread.) Or it could be that progress in AI itself accelerates, or perhaps linear progress in something like “general intelligence” translates to super-linear impact on productivity.
I mostly have in mind the idea that AI is “early-stage,” as you say. The thought is that “general purpose technologies” (GPTs) like electricity, the steam engine, the computer, and (probably) AI tend to have very delayed effects.
For example, there was really major progress in computing in the middle of the 20th century, and lots of really major invents throughout the 70s and 80s, but computers didn’t have a noticeable impact on productivity growth until the 90s. The first serious electric motors were developed in the mid-19th century, but electricity didn’t have a big impact on productivity until the early 20th. There was also a big lag associated with steam power; it didn’t really matter until the middle of the 19th century, even though the first steam engines were developed centuries earlier.
So if AI takes several decades to have a large economic impact, this would be consistent with analagous cases from history. It can take a long time for the technology to improve, for engineers to get trained up, for complementary inventions to be developed, for useful infrastructure to be built, for organizational structures to get redesigned around the technology, etc. I don’t think it’d be very surprising if 80 years was enough for a lot of really major changes to happen, especially since the “time to impact” for GPTs seems to be shrinking over time.
Then I’m also factoring in the additional possibility that there will be some unusually dramatic acceleration, which is distinguishes AI from most earlier GPTs.
That seems plausible and is also consistent with Amara’s law (the idea that the impact of technology is often overestimated in the short run and underestimated in the long run).
I’m curious how likely you think it is that productivity growth will be significantly higher (i.e. levels at least comparable with electricity) for any reason, not just AI. I wouldn’t give this much more than 50%, as there is also some evidence that stagnation is on the cards (see e.g. 1, 2). But that would mean that you’re confident that the cause of higher productivity growth, assuming that this happens, would be AI? (Rather than, say, synthetic biotechnology, or genetic engineering, or some other technological advance, or some social change resulting in more optimisation for productivity.)
While AI is perhaps the most plausible single candidate, it’s still quite unclear, so I’d maybe say it’s 25-30% likely that AI in particular will cause significantly higher levels of productivity growth this century.