my impression is that very few people have the comprehensive expertise to think well about these things.
Do you mean people in general? Or, in EA/neuroscience/consciousness research, …
In humans and other apes, the cerebral cortex is also widely believed to be largely responsible for generating our conscious experiences.
Could you share any resources that suggest otherwise? It could be also interesting to seem them on a timeline.
A human without a cerebral cortex is, for the most part, a living body with no mind.
If ‘mind’ is interpreted as “awareness and intentional activity” and “body regulation and arousal” is not considered ‘living.’
The behavior of decorticate rats is remarkably unaffected by extensive damage or removal of their cerebral cortex.
So, it can be argued that healthy rats are unaware and unintentional and thus do not live?
Various social changes Notably, inferior maternal care
Is it that what makes us ‘a species with a prominent cortex’ is care (I mean the reverse of causality)? How does k- and r-selection relate to a species cortex properties (and to consciousness)?
Difficulty with some complex cognitive tasks Inability to reason abstractly about locations Absence of food hoarding behavior
Can individuals with no or relatively non-prominent cortex be really ‘present in the moment and place?’ Would then species with ‘lesser’ cortex than humans be much happier if they feel well in a place and are fed and sadder if they do not than humans do because humans ‘carry’ some memory and plan?
require subtle experimental designs to detect.
Out of curiosity, do you know of any designs or labs?
the behavioral effects of decortication suggest that consciousness is either restricted to primates or else it is distributed fairly widely outside mammals.
Only rats were studied so conclusions about various brains and nervous systems cannot be stated. Is it that this reasoning could suggest that primates would be more conscious than other species but not that these species would be non-conscious because cortex does affect rats’ behavior somewhat? Also, even if the decorticate rat behaves similarly as one with cortex, it can be that it is less conscious, for example cannot feel closeness with family as much on in specific ways?
Alongside the lines of 4), it could be argued that humans have some consciousness in different parts of the brain, nervous system, cells, and other parts of the body, depending on the definition of consciousness. Thus, humans can ‘empathize’ with different species by focusing on that part/activating it and deactivating others. For example, species that experience “arousal” but not “intentional activity” can be empathized with by focusing the former while seeking to block the latter.
Do you mean people in general? Or, in EA/neuroscience/consciousness research, …
Maybe this was unfair. I meant that these issues touch on comparative neuroanatomy, evolutionary neuroscience, animal experimentation, and the philosophy of consciousness, and few people (in academia or out) have much experience in all of them. I also think consciousness is just really hard to think about.
Could you share any resources that suggest otherwise?
The Merker piece I cite is the prime example of a denial in the contemporary literature. Merker draws inspiration from Penfield and Jasper, who had a similar view in the middle of the last century.
How does k- and r-selection relate to a species cortex properties (and to consciousness)?
Social animals tend to have significantly larger brains, so I expect k-selection species would have larger brains, and probably larger cortices too, though I’m not entirely sure about how k-selection species compare with closely related r-selection species. Social animals may have a need for mental flexibility empathy that helps account for the value of consciousness, but that is pretty speculative.
Only rats were studied so conclusions about various brains and nervous systems cannot be stated. Is it that this reasoning could suggest that primates would be more conscious than other species but not that these species would be non-conscious because cortex does affect rats’ behavior somewhat? Also, even if the decorticate rat behaves similarly as one with cortex, it can be that it is less conscious, for example cannot feel closeness with family as much on in specific ways?
I’m pretty confident that humans and other primates have a greater range of possible conscious experiences than rats, and that the complexity of our cortex has something to do with it. The big question is whether the cortex does something that allows for consciousness or whether it just does something that shapes conscious experiences.
Are you aware of the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness? What do you think about it?
I think it is a great piece of marketing, but not based on great evidence. There remains a ton of disagreement on which capacities and which brain regions are responsible for consciousness in human beings. It is overly presumptive to declare that we’re confident that other animals have exactly what’s necessary for consciousness. The best arguments for animal consciousness come from behavior, not comparative neuroscience.
Do you mean people in general? Or, in EA/neuroscience/consciousness research, …
Could you share any resources that suggest otherwise? It could be also interesting to seem them on a timeline.
If ‘mind’ is interpreted as “awareness and intentional activity” and “body regulation and arousal” is not considered ‘living.’
So, it can be argued that healthy rats are unaware and unintentional and thus do not live?
Is it that what makes us ‘a species with a prominent cortex’ is care (I mean the reverse of causality)? How does k- and r-selection relate to a species cortex properties (and to consciousness)?
Can individuals with no or relatively non-prominent cortex be really ‘present in the moment and place?’ Would then species with ‘lesser’ cortex than humans be much happier if they feel well in a place and are fed and sadder if they do not than humans do because humans ‘carry’ some memory and plan?
Out of curiosity, do you know of any designs or labs?
Only rats were studied so conclusions about various brains and nervous systems cannot be stated. Is it that this reasoning could suggest that primates would be more conscious than other species but not that these species would be non-conscious because cortex does affect rats’ behavior somewhat? Also, even if the decorticate rat behaves similarly as one with cortex, it can be that it is less conscious, for example cannot feel closeness with family as much on in specific ways?
Alongside the lines of 4), it could be argued that humans have some consciousness in different parts of the brain, nervous system, cells, and other parts of the body, depending on the definition of consciousness. Thus, humans can ‘empathize’ with different species by focusing on that part/activating it and deactivating others. For example, species that experience “arousal” but not “intentional activity” can be empathized with by focusing the former while seeking to block the latter.
Are you aware of the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness? What do you think about it?
Maybe this was unfair. I meant that these issues touch on comparative neuroanatomy, evolutionary neuroscience, animal experimentation, and the philosophy of consciousness, and few people (in academia or out) have much experience in all of them. I also think consciousness is just really hard to think about.
The Merker piece I cite is the prime example of a denial in the contemporary literature. Merker draws inspiration from Penfield and Jasper, who had a similar view in the middle of the last century.
Social animals tend to have significantly larger brains, so I expect k-selection species would have larger brains, and probably larger cortices too, though I’m not entirely sure about how k-selection species compare with closely related r-selection species. Social animals may have a need for mental flexibility empathy that helps account for the value of consciousness, but that is pretty speculative.
I’m pretty confident that humans and other primates have a greater range of possible conscious experiences than rats, and that the complexity of our cortex has something to do with it. The big question is whether the cortex does something that allows for consciousness or whether it just does something that shapes conscious experiences.
I think it is a great piece of marketing, but not based on great evidence. There remains a ton of disagreement on which capacities and which brain regions are responsible for consciousness in human beings. It is overly presumptive to declare that we’re confident that other animals have exactly what’s necessary for consciousness. The best arguments for animal consciousness come from behavior, not comparative neuroscience.