I’m curating this post. I think it helps fight a real confusion — the idea that utilitarianism (or consequentialism) is the only moral theory that needs to grapple with extremely counterintuitive (or “repugnant”) conclusions.
As the author writes, “gaps in a theory shouldn’t be mistaken for solutions.” (I’m not, however, nearly as confident that consequentialism is ultimately the best answer.)
Michael’s critical comment, which points out other appeals of neutrality (a position this post argues against), and also remarks that the counterintuitiveness of the party vs. future people scenario might be artificially boosted by negative connotations to partying. I think this kind of intuition-check is really useful. Another comment points out tensions between rationality and unbounded expected utility maximization, suggesting that we should embrace timidity.
I’m curating this post. I think it helps fight a real confusion — the idea that utilitarianism (or consequentialism) is the only moral theory that needs to grapple with extremely counterintuitive (or “repugnant”) conclusions.
As the author writes, “gaps in a theory shouldn’t be mistaken for solutions.” (I’m not, however, nearly as confident that consequentialism is ultimately the best answer.)
I also want to highlight:
A summary of a paper that’s prominently linked in the post: Paper summary: A Paradox for Tiny Probabilities and Enormous Values (Nick Beckstead and Teruji Thomas).
Michael’s critical comment, which points out other appeals of neutrality (a position this post argues against), and also remarks that the counterintuitiveness of the party vs. future people scenario might be artificially boosted by negative connotations to partying. I think this kind of intuition-check is really useful. Another comment points out tensions between rationality and unbounded expected utility maximization, suggesting that we should embrace timidity.
Thanks!