I’m saying that on some views, you might want to make people do better things on their values, so long as those values are supported by good metamoral thinking. One way to do that is promote good clear thinking, or philosophical thinking in general, rather than just promoting your personal moral system. And for some reasons, perhaps signalling-related, it’s much more common to see people profess and evangelise their personal moral beliefs than metaethical or general philosophical ones.
I’m curious under what circumstances we can judge thinking to be better or worse but can’t make such judgments of “metamoral reasoning”.
I’m saying that on some views, you might want to make people do better things on their values, so long as those values are supported by good metamoral thinking. One way to do that is promote good clear thinking, or philosophical thinking in general, rather than just promoting your personal moral system. And for some reasons, perhaps signalling-related, it’s much more common to see people profess and evangelise their personal moral beliefs than metaethical or general philosophical ones.