Correspondingly, while the OP does not engage in “literally lying” I think sentences like “In light of this ruling, we believe that farmers are breaking the law if they continue to keep these chickens.” and “The judges have ruled in favour on our main argument—that the law says that animals should not be kept in the UK if it means they will suffer because of how they have been bred.” strike me as highly misleading, or at least willfully ignorant, based on your explanation here.
I don’t think THL UK’s view of the case is as unreasonable as implied. (See my reply below.) And it’s reasonable for them to provide their view of what it implies for farmers. But the statement about the judges’ ruling does seem somewhat misleading because it suggests that the law is concerned with whether animals will suffer in practice, whereas it seems to be concerned with whether they will suffer in theory. In other words, something like “the law says that animals should not be kept in the UK if it means they will invariably suffer because of how they have been bred” may be more accurate. But again, I don’t think this is as hard to prove as it might seem at first glance. (Again, see my reply below for a fuller analysis.)
I don’t think THL UK’s view of the case is as unreasonable as implied.
THL claimed “we believe that last week’s ruling on Franken chickens marks ‘the beginning of the end of this type of this type of outdated farming’”[1] and has a collaborative post on their Instagram page that states that this ruling marked “a significant victory for animal welfare.”[2][3]
The Court dismissed THL’s case, and provided an unfavorable interpretation of the animal welfare law in question.[4] All trial courts in the UK (except for those in Northern Ireland and Scotland) are now required to use this unfavorable interpretation of the animal welfare law in question.
Note: THL also states in their post “we got the result we had been nervously waiting for” and “This is a huge moment for animals in the UK”. Further, on THL’s website, they state “The judgment is in on one of the most important legal cases for animals in history.”
Thanks for getting back to me. I think there is a spectrum of interpretations of Paragraph 29, some more favourable and some less favourable to animals.
The least favourable interpretation is that the law does not provide farms with a “conditional permission”—that is, the law does not establish a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals subject to a “proviso”. This was the position taken by a High Court judge in May 2023, and would have ruled out private prosecutions of farms.
The “victory” in the Court of Appeal came in the Court’s ruling that:
Paragraph 29 is correctly characterisied as a prohibition which is subject to a proviso. The keeping of animals for farming purposes is prohibited unless it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detrimental effect on their health and welfare… In this respect, therefore, [the Court does not] agree with the view of the judge, who considered that Paragraph 29 could not be read this way.
In disagreement with the judge, the Court held in summary that the relevant paragraphs of the Regulations establish a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals which have been bred by genetic selection with a view to achieving certain characteristics, unless it can reasonably be expected on the basis of the way that they have been bred that the animals can be kept without any detrimental effect on health and welfare… The Judgment is a significant analysis of the legal obligations that apply to keepers of meat chickens and is likely to have consequences for farmed animals generally. The way forward will be a matter for the Government or the courts in the event of prosecutions.
It is true that the most favourable interpretation for animals—that the law establishes a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals in the conditions that they are likely to be kept—was not upheld by the Court.
But I maintain that while this means that the bar is high, I don’t think it’s as high as it seems at first glance. You rightly point out that the Court said that “Paragraph 29 is a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals whose genotype and phenotype mean that, regardless of the conditions in which they are kept, they cannot be kept without detriment to their health or welfare”.
But they go on to say:
However, this needs some further explanation. There is a difference between detrimental characteristics which are inherent in the nature of the breed and which cannot be mitigated by changing the environmental conditions in which the animal is kept, and those which can be so mitigated… the conclusions contained in the RSPCA Report, if valid… appear to illustrate this difference. If it is correct (and I emphasise ‘if’) that, when compared with slow-growing chickens, a particular breed of fast-growing chickens suffers from increased heart problems with consequential higher mortality, or leg development disorders because the chicken cannot support its own weight, it would seem likely (contrary to the Secretary of State’s view, although this is ultimately a matter for scientific evidence) that no improvement in the environmental conditions in which such chickens are kept could mitigate those detrimental effects upon their health or welfare. Those consequences would be inherent in the particular breed of chicken and the keeping of such a breed would be prohibited by Paragraph 29. The same might be true of the problems caused by hock burn and foot burn as a result of prolonged periods of inactivity.
Similarly, Welfare Footprint write: “Although the adoption of better management practices – including lower stocking density, longer resting times and the provision of enrichment – is beneficial and desirable for improving broiler welfare, their impact is limited if the negative welfare effects inherently associated with the genetics for fast growth are not addressed.”
One question I do have is why THL UK took DEFRA to Court, instead of bringing a private prosecution of a factory farm. One reason might be that this was an attempt to affect the whole industry, whereas any positive Judgment in the case of a particular farm might still only apply to that farm, even if it establishes a precedent that can be used to bring successful prosecutions against other farms. In other words, taking DEFRA to Court may have been considered a quicker and more efficient route.
Thank you for clarifying this. We agree that our comment above implied a greater degree of unreasonableness on behalf of THL than was warranted.
That being said, we still believe the law is likely in a worse place for animals compared to before the filing of the initial case. The interpretation offered by the Court appears to be quite strict, and we suspect it will be difficult for subsequent litigants to meet the evidentiary standard established by this case. Hopefully we are wrong about this.
We also still believe that THL’s communication surrounding this case was quite poor, and misleading. Notably, THL did not even disclose the name of the court case in this post, or in the post on their website.
Huh, yeah, seems like a loss to me.
Correspondingly, while the OP does not engage in “literally lying” I think sentences like “In light of this ruling, we believe that farmers are breaking the law if they continue to keep these chickens.” and “The judges have ruled in favour on our main argument—that the law says that animals should not be kept in the UK if it means they will suffer because of how they have been bred.” strike me as highly misleading, or at least willfully ignorant, based on your explanation here.
Agreed, this post seems like it goes way against standard forum norms if this is correct
I don’t think THL UK’s view of the case is as unreasonable as implied. (See my reply below.) And it’s reasonable for them to provide their view of what it implies for farmers. But the statement about the judges’ ruling does seem somewhat misleading because it suggests that the law is concerned with whether animals will suffer in practice, whereas it seems to be concerned with whether they will suffer in theory. In other words, something like “the law says that animals should not be kept in the UK if it means they will invariably suffer because of how they have been bred” may be more accurate. But again, I don’t think this is as hard to prove as it might seem at first glance. (Again, see my reply below for a fuller analysis.)
THL claimed “we believe that last week’s ruling on Franken chickens marks ‘the beginning of the end of this type of this type of outdated farming’”[1] and has a collaborative post on their Instagram page that states that this ruling marked “a significant victory for animal welfare.”[2][3]
The Court dismissed THL’s case, and provided an unfavorable interpretation of the animal welfare law in question.[4] All trial courts in the UK (except for those in Northern Ireland and Scotland) are now required to use this unfavorable interpretation of the animal welfare law in question.
Is this a significant victory for animal welfare?
https://x.com/humaneleagueuk/status/1868675467932295355
Note: THL also states in their post “we got the result we had been nervously waiting for” and “This is a huge moment for animals in the UK”. Further, on THL’s website, they state “The judgment is in on one of the most important legal cases for animals in history.”
https://www.instagram.com/p/DDko43NtAeF/?hl=en&img_index=1
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Humane-League-UK-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Environment-Food-and-Rural-Affairs-Press-Summary.pdf
Thanks for getting back to me. I think there is a spectrum of interpretations of Paragraph 29, some more favourable and some less favourable to animals.
The least favourable interpretation is that the law does not provide farms with a “conditional permission”—that is, the law does not establish a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals subject to a “proviso”. This was the position taken by a High Court judge in May 2023, and would have ruled out private prosecutions of farms.
The “victory” in the Court of Appeal came in the Court’s ruling that:
As Essex Court Chambers put it:
It is true that the most favourable interpretation for animals—that the law establishes a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals in the conditions that they are likely to be kept—was not upheld by the Court.
But I maintain that while this means that the bar is high, I don’t think it’s as high as it seems at first glance. You rightly point out that the Court said that “Paragraph 29 is a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals whose genotype and phenotype mean that, regardless of the conditions in which they are kept, they cannot be kept without detriment to their health or welfare”.
But they go on to say:
Similarly, Welfare Footprint write: “Although the adoption of better management practices – including lower stocking density, longer resting times and the provision of enrichment – is beneficial and desirable for improving broiler welfare, their impact is limited if the negative welfare effects inherently associated with the genetics for fast growth are not addressed.”
One question I do have is why THL UK took DEFRA to Court, instead of bringing a private prosecution of a factory farm. One reason might be that this was an attempt to affect the whole industry, whereas any positive Judgment in the case of a particular farm might still only apply to that farm, even if it establishes a precedent that can be used to bring successful prosecutions against other farms. In other words, taking DEFRA to Court may have been considered a quicker and more efficient route.
This might be of interest to: @Ozzie Gooen @MHR @MichaelStJules @bruce @Rasool.
Thank you for clarifying this. We agree that our comment above implied a greater degree of unreasonableness on behalf of THL than was warranted.
That being said, we still believe the law is likely in a worse place for animals compared to before the filing of the initial case. The interpretation offered by the Court appears to be quite strict, and we suspect it will be difficult for subsequent litigants to meet the evidentiary standard established by this case. Hopefully we are wrong about this.
We also still believe that THL’s communication surrounding this case was quite poor, and misleading. Notably, THL did not even disclose the name of the court case in this post, or in the post on their website.