I’d suggest reading prior discussions of the so-called “poor meat eater problem.”
I see a few problems with this argument. (These are mostly not original ideas.)
This argument would likely reflect badly on EA and/or animal advocacy if it became more common and more public. Unpopular arguments may be worth it if the benefits of arguing them outweigh the costs, but that seems unlikely here.
If you believe farmed animal welfare is the cause area that warrants the highest priority, then you should be looking for the most cost-effective interventions within that cause area. There are interventions in this area that seem very cost-effective, such as corporate campaigns, and it seems unlikely that persuading EAs working in global poverty that their interventions are harmful, or pursuing human population control interventions instead, is anywhere near as cost-effective.
This analysis looks at one potential flow-through effect of EA global poverty interventions, and does not consider any others that could potentially benefit animals:
Good things can lead to more good things, e.g. Open Phil has recommended $80 million in effective grants towards farmed animal welfare, but they would not exist if GiveWell had not established their credibility in global poverty. (Open Phil started out as a GiveWell project called GiveWell Labs.)
Solving human problems may free up resources for solving animal welfare problems.
Increases in human population and/or consumption may lead to decreases in wild animal populations, which may reduce wild animal suffering.
It’s better if EAs working on global poverty and animal welfare are cooperative rather than antagonistic.
This analysis looks at one potential flow-through effect of EA global poverty interventions, and does not consider any others that could potentially benefit animals:
Good things can lead to more good things, e.g. Open Phil has recommended $80 million in effective grants towards farmed animal welfare, but they would not exist if GiveWell had not established their credibility in global poverty. (Open Phil started out as a GiveWell project called GiveWell Labs.)
Solving human problems may free up resources for solving animal welfare problems.
Increases in human population and/or consumption may lead to decreases in wild animal populations, which may reduce wild animal suffering.
I think it’s worth pointing out that some of these effects are much more estimable and likely to be significant than others, and probably many people primarily donating to GiveWell-recommended charities give little weight to speculative considerations; that’s often why they’re giving to these charities in the first place.
I think the effects on farmed animals (at least numbers) can be estimated fairly rigorously a few decades out based on current consumption rates, trends in consumption, population trends and income elasticities.
I think your first two considerations are pretty speculative, and the kind that should be given little weight unless you think these effects are actually as important or more important than what’s actually included in GiveWell’s analyses, and if they are, then it would be an amazing coincidence that GiveWell-recommended charities are still the best opportunities among those EA has considered.
The effects on wild animals could potentially be estimated with a wide confidence interval, and considerable deep uncertainty about welfare in the wild. We might even think increasing animal product consumption itself is (sometimes) good because it takes more land and so reduces wild animal populations.
It’s better if EAs working on global poverty and animal welfare are cooperative rather than antagonistic.
If (big if!) global poverty work is badly net-negative in the views of those working on animal welfare (kbog concludes income effects are overall good), those working on global poverty might be acting uncooperatively just by working on it. Animal welfare work seems usually unlikely to be bad for humans, including the global poor (since their countries are not usually targeted), and is plausibly pretty good, if you include climate change, zoonotic diseases and antibiotic resistance.
However, I think cooperation is more important for those holding less popular positions, since they have less power, and prioritizing animal welfare is less popular than prioritizing global poverty in EA and in general.
I’d suggest reading prior discussions of the so-called “poor meat eater problem.”
I see a few problems with this argument. (These are mostly not original ideas.)
This argument would likely reflect badly on EA and/or animal advocacy if it became more common and more public. Unpopular arguments may be worth it if the benefits of arguing them outweigh the costs, but that seems unlikely here.
If you believe farmed animal welfare is the cause area that warrants the highest priority, then you should be looking for the most cost-effective interventions within that cause area. There are interventions in this area that seem very cost-effective, such as corporate campaigns, and it seems unlikely that persuading EAs working in global poverty that their interventions are harmful, or pursuing human population control interventions instead, is anywhere near as cost-effective.
This analysis looks at one potential flow-through effect of EA global poverty interventions, and does not consider any others that could potentially benefit animals:
Good things can lead to more good things, e.g. Open Phil has recommended $80 million in effective grants towards farmed animal welfare, but they would not exist if GiveWell had not established their credibility in global poverty. (Open Phil started out as a GiveWell project called GiveWell Labs.)
Solving human problems may free up resources for solving animal welfare problems.
Increases in human population and/or consumption may lead to decreases in wild animal populations, which may reduce wild animal suffering.
It’s better if EAs working on global poverty and animal welfare are cooperative rather than antagonistic.
I think it’s worth pointing out that some of these effects are much more estimable and likely to be significant than others, and probably many people primarily donating to GiveWell-recommended charities give little weight to speculative considerations; that’s often why they’re giving to these charities in the first place.
I think the effects on farmed animals (at least numbers) can be estimated fairly rigorously a few decades out based on current consumption rates, trends in consumption, population trends and income elasticities.
I think your first two considerations are pretty speculative, and the kind that should be given little weight unless you think these effects are actually as important or more important than what’s actually included in GiveWell’s analyses, and if they are, then it would be an amazing coincidence that GiveWell-recommended charities are still the best opportunities among those EA has considered.
The effects on wild animals could potentially be estimated with a wide confidence interval, and considerable deep uncertainty about welfare in the wild. We might even think increasing animal product consumption itself is (sometimes) good because it takes more land and so reduces wild animal populations.
If (big if!) global poverty work is badly net-negative in the views of those working on animal welfare (kbog concludes income effects are overall good), those working on global poverty might be acting uncooperatively just by working on it. Animal welfare work seems usually unlikely to be bad for humans, including the global poor (since their countries are not usually targeted), and is plausibly pretty good, if you include climate change, zoonotic diseases and antibiotic resistance.
However, I think cooperation is more important for those holding less popular positions, since they have less power, and prioritizing animal welfare is less popular than prioritizing global poverty in EA and in general.