It’s plausible that compared to a stable authoritarian nuclear state, an unstable or couped authoritarian nuclear state could be even worse (in worst-case scenario and even potentially in expected value).
For a worst-case scenario, consider that if a popular uprising is on the verge of ousting Kim Jong Un, he may desperately nuke who-know’s-where or order an artillery strike on Seoul.
Also, if you believe these high-access defectors’ interviews, most North Korean soldiers genuinely believe that they can win a war against the U.S. and South Korea. This means that even if there is a palace coup rather than a popular uprising, it’s plausible that an irrational general rises to power and starts an irrational nuclear war with the intent to win.
So I think it’s plausible that prevention is an entirely different beast than policy regarding already existing stable, authoritarian, and armed states.
It’s plausible that compared to a stable authoritarian nuclear state, an unstable or couped authoritarian nuclear state could be even worse (in worst-case scenario and even potentially in expected value).
For a worst-case scenario, consider that if a popular uprising is on the verge of ousting Kim Jong Un, he may desperately nuke who-know’s-where or order an artillery strike on Seoul.
Also, if you believe these high-access defectors’ interviews, most North Korean soldiers genuinely believe that they can win a war against the U.S. and South Korea. This means that even if there is a palace coup rather than a popular uprising, it’s plausible that an irrational general rises to power and starts an irrational nuclear war with the intent to win.
So I think it’s plausible that prevention is an entirely different beast than policy regarding already existing stable, authoritarian, and armed states.