bxjaeger—fair point. It’s worth emphasizing Paul Bloom’s distinction between rational compassion and emotional empathy, and the superiority of the former when thinking about evidence-based policies and interventions.
Agreed—I think Paul Bloom’s distinction makes a lot of sense. Many prominent empathy researchers have pushed back on this, mostly to argue for the Empathy 3 definition that I listed, but I don’t see any benefit in conflating these very different processes under one umbrella term.
Yep—I think Paul Bloom makes an important point in arguing that ‘Empathy 2’ (or ‘rational compassion’) is more consistent with EA-style scope-sensitivity, and less likely to lead to ‘compassion fatigue’, compared to ‘Empathy 1’ (feeling another’s suffering as if it’s one’s own).
bxjaeger—fair point. It’s worth emphasizing Paul Bloom’s distinction between rational compassion and emotional empathy, and the superiority of the former when thinking about evidence-based policies and interventions.
Agreed—I think Paul Bloom’s distinction makes a lot of sense. Many prominent empathy researchers have pushed back on this, mostly to argue for the Empathy 3 definition that I listed, but I don’t see any benefit in conflating these very different processes under one umbrella term.
Yep—I think Paul Bloom makes an important point in arguing that ‘Empathy 2’ (or ‘rational compassion’) is more consistent with EA-style scope-sensitivity, and less likely to lead to ‘compassion fatigue’, compared to ‘Empathy 1’ (feeling another’s suffering as if it’s one’s own).