It sounds to me like this scenario is about a difference in the variances of the respective subjective probability distributions over future stock values. The variance of a distribution of credences does not measure how “well or poorly supported by evidence” that distribution is.
My worry about statements of the form “My credences over the total future utility given intervention A are characterized by distribution P” does not have to do with the variance of the distribution P. It has to do with the fact that I do not know whether I should trust the procedures that generated P to track reality.
It sounds to me like this scenario is about a difference in the variances of the respective subjective probability distributions over future stock values. The variance of a distribution of credences does not measure how “well or poorly supported by evidence” that distribution is.
Well in this case at least, it is apparent that the differences are caused by how well or poorly supported people’s beliefs are. It doesn’t say anything about variance in general.
My worry about statements of the form “My credences over the total future utility given intervention A are characterized by distribution P” does not have to do with the variance of the distribution P. It has to do with the fact that I do not know whether I should trust the procedures that generated P to track reality.
Distribution P is your credence. So you are saying “I am worried that my credences don’t have to do with my credence.” That doesn’t make sense. And sure we’re uncertain of whether our beliefs are accurate, but I don’t see what the problem with that is.
Distribution P is your credence. So you are saying “I am worried that my credences don’t have to do with my credence.” That doesn’t make sense. And sure we’re uncertain of whether our beliefs are accurate, but I don’t see what the problem with that is.
I’m having difficulty parsing the statement you’ve attributed to me, or mapping it what I’ve said. In any case, I think many people share the intuition that “frequentist” properties of one’s credences matter. People care about calibration training and Brier scores, for instance. It’s not immediately clear to me why it’s nonsensical to say “P is my credence, but should I trust it?”
It sounds to me like this scenario is about a difference in the variances of the respective subjective probability distributions over future stock values. The variance of a distribution of credences does not measure how “well or poorly supported by evidence” that distribution is.
My worry about statements of the form “My credences over the total future utility given intervention A are characterized by distribution P” does not have to do with the variance of the distribution P. It has to do with the fact that I do not know whether I should trust the procedures that generated P to track reality.
Well in this case at least, it is apparent that the differences are caused by how well or poorly supported people’s beliefs are. It doesn’t say anything about variance in general.
Distribution P is your credence. So you are saying “I am worried that my credences don’t have to do with my credence.” That doesn’t make sense. And sure we’re uncertain of whether our beliefs are accurate, but I don’t see what the problem with that is.
I’m having difficulty parsing the statement you’ve attributed to me, or mapping it what I’ve said. In any case, I think many people share the intuition that “frequentist” properties of one’s credences matter. People care about calibration training and Brier scores, for instance. It’s not immediately clear to me why it’s nonsensical to say “P is my credence, but should I trust it?”