I certainly agree that this is worth thinking about, but I also think it’s worth suggesting that the analysis here is be a bit myopic. Of course, it seems particularly relevant because many EAs are in the US. And it seems unconceivable that the world will change drastically in this one particular way, but far larger plausible changes are on the horizon. (Though as I’ve noted n various conversations for a while, Americans might want to personally consider their options for where else they might want to live if the US decline continues.)
And if the worst case happens, we’re still likely looking at a decades-long process, during which most of the worst effects are mitigated by other countries taking up the slack, and pushing for the US’s decline to be minimally disruptive to the world. Nations and empires have collapsed before, and in many cases it was was bad, even very bad. (Though in other cases, like the dissolution of the British empire, there were compensating changes, like the rise of the US and the far more egalitarian and peaceful post-WWII order.) So preventing a bad collapse is plausibly as important a cause as preventing another pandemic like COVID-19 - albeit far less certain to occur, and far less certain to be bad for the world. And it’s not of the same order of magnitude of many other longtermist causes, since it’s highly likely that conditional on the unlikely case of severe collapse in the US, humanity will be fine.
All that said, again, I don’t disagree with the analysis overall—this is worth taking seriously.
I’m not actually sure we disagree on anything. I agree that
if the worst case happens, we’re still likely looking at a decades-long process, during which most of the worst effects are mitigated by other countries taking up the slack, and pushing for the US’s decline to be minimally disruptive to the world.
I definitely also agree that it behooves EAs to try to avoid myopia. I have tried to do so here but may very well have failed!
In terms of expected disvalue, I would guess that severe and rapid collapses (more like the USSR than France or Spain) are the most important, due to the nuclear insecurity and possible triggering of great-power conflict.
As for cost-competitiveness with other longtermist interventions, it seems that increasing nuclear security from domestic instability is actually pretty tractable and may be neglected. If so, that suggests to me that it may be approximately as cost-effective as most marginal nuclear security work generally. The only other things that seem plausibly cost-effective to me now are contingency planning for key longtermist institutions so that their operations are minimally disrupted by a turbulent decline.
I particularly endorse the claim about tractability and effectiveness of technical changes to internal nuclear weapon security and contingency planning, both with moderate confidence.
I certainly agree that this is worth thinking about, but I also think it’s worth suggesting that the analysis here is be a bit myopic. Of course, it seems particularly relevant because many EAs are in the US. And it seems unconceivable that the world will change drastically in this one particular way, but far larger plausible changes are on the horizon. (Though as I’ve noted n various conversations for a while, Americans might want to personally consider their options for where else they might want to live if the US decline continues.)
And if the worst case happens, we’re still likely looking at a decades-long process, during which most of the worst effects are mitigated by other countries taking up the slack, and pushing for the US’s decline to be minimally disruptive to the world. Nations and empires have collapsed before, and in many cases it was was bad, even very bad. (Though in other cases, like the dissolution of the British empire, there were compensating changes, like the rise of the US and the far more egalitarian and peaceful post-WWII order.) So preventing a bad collapse is plausibly as important a cause as preventing another pandemic like COVID-19 - albeit far less certain to occur, and far less certain to be bad for the world. And it’s not of the same order of magnitude of many other longtermist causes, since it’s highly likely that conditional on the unlikely case of severe collapse in the US, humanity will be fine.
All that said, again, I don’t disagree with the analysis overall—this is worth taking seriously.
Thanks David. Great analysis as usual :-)
I’m not actually sure we disagree on anything. I agree that
I definitely also agree that it behooves EAs to try to avoid myopia. I have tried to do so here but may very well have failed!
In terms of expected disvalue, I would guess that severe and rapid collapses (more like the USSR than France or Spain) are the most important, due to the nuclear insecurity and possible triggering of great-power conflict.
As for cost-competitiveness with other longtermist interventions, it seems that increasing nuclear security from domestic instability is actually pretty tractable and may be neglected. If so, that suggests to me that it may be approximately as cost-effective as most marginal nuclear security work generally. The only other things that seem plausibly cost-effective to me now are contingency planning for key longtermist institutions so that their operations are minimally disrupted by a turbulent decline.
I agree that we agree ;)
I particularly endorse the claim about tractability and effectiveness of technical changes to internal nuclear weapon security and contingency planning, both with moderate confidence.