[Replying separately with comments on progress on the pretty hard problem; the hard problem; and the meta-problem of consciousness]
The meta-problem of consciousness is distinct from both
a) the hard problem: roughly, the fundamental relationship between the physical and the phenomenal
b) the pretty hard problem, roughly, knowing which systems are phenomenally consciousness
The meta-problem is
c) explaining “why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain” (6)
The meta-problem has a very interesting relationship to the hard problem. To see what this relationship is, we need a distinction between what the “hard problem” of explaining consciousness, and what Chalmers calls the ‘easy’ problems of explaining “various objective behavioural or cognitive functions such as learning, memory, perceptual integration, and verbal report”.
(Much like ‘pretty hard’, the ‘easy’ is tongue in cheek—the easy problems are tremendously difficult and thousands of brilliant people with expensive fancy machines are constantly hard at work on them).
Ease of the easy problems: “the easy problems are easy because we have a standard paradigm for explaining them. To explain a function, we just need to find an appropriate neural or computational mechanism that performs that function. We know how to do this at least in principle.”
Hardness of the hard problem: “Even after we have explained all the objective functions that we like, there may still remain a further question: why is all this functioning accompanied by conscious experience?...the standard methods in the cognitive sciences have difficulty in gaining purchase on the hard problem.”
The meta problem is interesting because it is deeply related to the hard problem, but it is strictly speaking an ‘easy’ problem: it is about explaining certain cognitive and behavioral functions. For example: thinking “I am currently seeing purple and it seems strange to me that this experience could simply be explained in terms of physics” or “It sure seems like Mary in the black and white room lacks knowledge of what it’s like to see red”; or sitting down and writing “boy consciousness sure is puzzling, I bet I can funding to work on this.”
Chalmers hopes that cognitive science can make traction on the meta-problem, by explaining how these cognitive functions and behaviors come about in ‘topic neutral’ terms that don’t commit to any particular metaphysical theory of consciousness. And then if we have a solution to the meta problem, this might shed light on the hard problem.
One particular intriguing connection is that it seems like a) a solution to the meta problem should at least be possible and b) if it is, then it gives us a really good reason not to trust our beliefs about consciousness!
A solution to the meta problem is possible, so there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness.
If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified.
Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.
Part of the aforementioned growing interest in illusionism is that I think this argument is pretty good. Chalmers came up with it and elaborated it—even though he is not an illusionist—and I like his elaboration of it more than his replies!
[Replying separately with comments on progress on the pretty hard problem; the hard problem; and the meta-problem of consciousness]
The meta-problem of consciousness is distinct from both a) the hard problem: roughly, the fundamental relationship between the physical and the phenomenal b) the pretty hard problem, roughly, knowing which systems are phenomenally consciousness
The meta-problem is c) explaining “why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain” (6)
The meta-problem has a very interesting relationship to the hard problem. To see what this relationship is, we need a distinction between what the “hard problem” of explaining consciousness, and what Chalmers calls the ‘easy’ problems of explaining “various objective behavioural or cognitive functions such as learning, memory, perceptual integration, and verbal report”.
(Much like ‘pretty hard’, the ‘easy’ is tongue in cheek—the easy problems are tremendously difficult and thousands of brilliant people with expensive fancy machines are constantly hard at work on them).
Ease of the easy problems: “the easy problems are easy because we have a standard paradigm for explaining them. To explain a function, we just need to find an appropriate neural or computational mechanism that performs that function. We know how to do this at least in principle.”
Hardness of the hard problem: “Even after we have explained all the objective functions that we like, there may still remain a further question: why is all this functioning accompanied by conscious experience?...the standard methods in the cognitive sciences have difficulty in gaining purchase on the hard problem.”
The meta problem is interesting because it is deeply related to the hard problem, but it is strictly speaking an ‘easy’ problem: it is about explaining certain cognitive and behavioral functions. For example: thinking “I am currently seeing purple and it seems strange to me that this experience could simply be explained in terms of physics” or “It sure seems like Mary in the black and white room lacks knowledge of what it’s like to see red”; or sitting down and writing “boy consciousness sure is puzzling, I bet I can funding to work on this.”
Chalmers hopes that cognitive science can make traction on the meta-problem, by explaining how these cognitive functions and behaviors come about in ‘topic neutral’ terms that don’t commit to any particular metaphysical theory of consciousness. And then if we have a solution to the meta problem, this might shed light on the hard problem.
One particular intriguing connection is that it seems like a) a solution to the meta problem should at least be possible and b) if it is, then it gives us a really good reason not to trust our beliefs about consciousness!
A solution to the meta problem is possible, so there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness.
If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified.
Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.
Part of the aforementioned growing interest in illusionism is that I think this argument is pretty good. Chalmers came up with it and elaborated it—even though he is not an illusionist—and I like his elaboration of it more than his replies!