If preference utilitarianism is correct there may be no utility function that accurately describes the true value of things. This will be the case if people’s preferences aren’t continuous or aren’t complete, for instance if they’re expressed as a vector. This generalises to other forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in.
When you say “this generalizes to other forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in”, what does “this” refer to? Is it the statement: “there may be no utility function that accurately describes the true value of things” ?
Do the “forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in” ever intend to have a fully accurate utility function?
If preference utilitarianism is correct there may be no utility function that accurately describes the true value of things. This will be the case if people’s preferences aren’t continuous or aren’t complete, for instance if they’re expressed as a vector. This generalises to other forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in.
What do you mean by correct?
When you say “this generalizes to other forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in”, what does “this” refer to? Is it the statement: “there may be no utility function that accurately describes the true value of things” ?
Do the “forms of consequentialism that don’t have a utility function baked in” ever intend to have a fully accurate utility function?