The repugnant conclusion is presented as an objection to certain views in population axiology. The claim is that a possible world containing sufficiently many morally relevant beings just above neutrality is intrinsically better than a possible world with arbitrarily many beings arbitrarily happy. The claim is not that these worlds could become actual, so empirical considerations of the sort you describe aren’t relevant for assessing the force of the objection.
Put differently, theories like total utilitarianism imply that the “repugnant” world would be better if it existed, and the objection is that this implication is implausible. The implausibility would remain even if it was shown that the “repugnant” world cannot exist.
Thank you very much, you put it words, what I could not. Your answer gave me not only the assurance that my doubts were justified, but also some confidence to ask more questions of that kind.Thank you.
The repugnant conclusion is presented as an objection to certain views in population axiology. The claim is that a possible world containing sufficiently many morally relevant beings just above neutrality is intrinsically better than a possible world with arbitrarily many beings arbitrarily happy. The claim is not that these worlds could become actual, so empirical considerations of the sort you describe aren’t relevant for assessing the force of the objection.
Put differently, theories like total utilitarianism imply that the “repugnant” world would be better if it existed, and the objection is that this implication is implausible. The implausibility would remain even if it was shown that the “repugnant” world cannot exist.
Thank you very much, you put it words, what I could not. Your answer gave me not only the assurance that my doubts were justified, but also some confidence to ask more questions of that kind.Thank you.