In other words, putting very rough guesses on the utility of each scenario:
Middle class in South Korea: 10
Muzak and potatoes: 0
Political dissident in North Korea: −100
I tend to agree that helping NK refugees prevents suffering, and that we should really have some back-of-the-envelope calculation to measure it. (Usually, when I assess the value of helping a refugee, I consider HDI differences between countries as a proxy for the increase in wellbeing; but we can’t do this for NK because we can’t rely on what they publish—and even if we could I don’t think it could still work as a proxy for welfare in a totalitarian state.)
But I don’t know if you considered how this could extrapolate to population ethics. Your conclusion that NK lives are net negative (and that the modulo of their value is 10x greater than that of a SK life) seems to imply that killing (or letting die, if you have deontic objections) NK people is a net good—and that letting 1 NK citizen die produces 10x more welfare than saving a SK life. Or that moving 1 NK citizen to SK produces about .55x the welfare of letting 2 NK citizens die.
I believe NK people would likely disagree with this conclusion, even if they were not being coerced to do so.
I understand your argument is very speculative, but my overall take is that perhaps we should be extra careful when we apply negative cardinal utility measures to people—and that perhaps our own personal utility functions may not extrapolate very well to moral evaluations of the welfare of others.
I believe NK people would likely disagree with this conclusion, even if they were not being coerced to do so.
I don’t have good intuitions on this, it doesn’t seem absurd to me.
Unrelated to NK, many people suffer immensely from terminal illnesses, but we still deny them the right to assisted suicide. For very good reasons, we have extremely strong biases against actively killing people, even when their lives are clearly net negative.
So yes, I think it’s plausible that many humans living in extreme poverty or under totalitarian regimes are experiencing extremely negative net utility, and under some ethical systems, that implies that it would be a net good to let them die.
That doesn’t mean we should promote policies that kill North Korean people or stop giving humanitarian food and medical aid.
I tend to agree that there are lives (human or not) not worth living, but my point is that it’s very difficult to consistently identify them by using my only own preference ordering. Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.”
(I’m assuming we’re not taking into account externalities and opportunity costs. An adult male lion’s seems pretty comfortable and positive, but it entails huge costs for other animals)
It’s even harder if you have to take into account the perspectives of the interested parties. For instance, in the example we’re discussing, SK people could also complain that your utility function implied that preventing one NK birth is equal to saving 10 SK lives. Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.
Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.”
Can you clarify?
Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.
I don’t know what they would find implausible. To me it seems plausible.
I tend to agree that helping NK refugees prevents suffering, and that we should really have some back-of-the-envelope calculation to measure it. (Usually, when I assess the value of helping a refugee, I consider HDI differences between countries as a proxy for the increase in wellbeing; but we can’t do this for NK because we can’t rely on what they publish—and even if we could I don’t think it could still work as a proxy for welfare in a totalitarian state.)
But I don’t know if you considered how this could extrapolate to population ethics. Your conclusion that NK lives are net negative (and that the modulo of their value is 10x greater than that of a SK life) seems to imply that killing (or letting die, if you have deontic objections) NK people is a net good—and that letting 1 NK citizen die produces 10x more welfare than saving a SK life. Or that moving 1 NK citizen to SK produces about .55x the welfare of letting 2 NK citizens die.
I believe NK people would likely disagree with this conclusion, even if they were not being coerced to do so.
I understand your argument is very speculative, but my overall take is that perhaps we should be extra careful when we apply negative cardinal utility measures to people—and that perhaps our own personal utility functions may not extrapolate very well to moral evaluations of the welfare of others.
Unrelated to NK, many people suffer immensely from terminal illnesses, but we still deny them the right to assisted suicide. For very good reasons, we have extremely strong biases against actively killing people, even when their lives are clearly net negative.
So yes, I think it’s plausible that many humans living in extreme poverty or under totalitarian regimes are experiencing extremely negative net utility, and under some ethical systems, that implies that it would be a net good to let them die.
That doesn’t mean we should promote policies that kill North Korean people or stop giving humanitarian food and medical aid.
I tend to agree that there are lives (human or not) not worth living, but my point is that it’s very difficult to consistently identify them by using my only own preference ordering. Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.” (I’m assuming we’re not taking into account externalities and opportunity costs. An adult male lion’s seems pretty comfortable and positive, but it entails huge costs for other animals) It’s even harder if you have to take into account the perspectives of the interested parties. For instance, in the example we’re discussing, SK people could also complain that your utility function implied that preventing one NK birth is equal to saving 10 SK lives. Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.