Cool post, very interesting! I’m fascinated by this topic—the PhD thesis I’m writing is on nuclear, bio and cyber weapons arms control regimes and what lessons can be drawn for AI. So obviously I’m very into this, and want to see more work done on this. Really excellent to see you exploring the parallels. A few thoughts:
Your point on ‘lock-in’ seems crucial. It currently seems to me that there are ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia) in which regimes get set and then its very hard to change them. So e.g. the failure to control nukes or cyber in early years. ABM is a complex example—very very hard to get back on the table, but Rumsfeld +others managed it after 30 years of battling.
My impression is that the BWC (and CWC) - the meetings/conferences etc—are often seen as arms control regimes that are pretty good at keeping up with technical developments—maybe a point in favour of centralisation.
Just on the details of the BWC, seems worth mentioning a few things. (Nitpicky: when the UK proposed a BWC, it said verification wasn’t technically possible at the time [1]). First, the Nixon Administration thought BW were militarily useless and had already unilaterally disarmed, so verification was less of a priority [2]. Second, one of the reasons to want a Verification Protocol in the 90s was the revelation that the Soviets cheated over the 70s-80s, building the biggest BW program ever. Third, the Bush Admin rejected the Verification Protocol in 2001 (pre 9/11!), its first year—at the same time as it was ripping up START III, Kyoto, and the ABM Treaty. This is all to suggest that state interest, and elites’ changing conceptions of state interest, can create space for change.
Hi Aryan,
Cool post, very interesting! I’m fascinated by this topic—the PhD thesis I’m writing is on nuclear, bio and cyber weapons arms control regimes and what lessons can be drawn for AI. So obviously I’m very into this, and want to see more work done on this. Really excellent to see you exploring the parallels. A few thoughts:
Your point on ‘lock-in’ seems crucial. It currently seems to me that there are ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia) in which regimes get set and then its very hard to change them. So e.g. the failure to control nukes or cyber in early years. ABM is a complex example—very very hard to get back on the table, but Rumsfeld +others managed it after 30 years of battling.
My impression is that the BWC (and CWC) - the meetings/conferences etc—are often seen as arms control regimes that are pretty good at keeping up with technical developments—maybe a point in favour of centralisation.
Just on the details of the BWC, seems worth mentioning a few things. (Nitpicky: when the UK proposed a BWC, it said verification wasn’t technically possible at the time [1]). First, the Nixon Administration thought BW were militarily useless and had already unilaterally disarmed, so verification was less of a priority [2]. Second, one of the reasons to want a Verification Protocol in the 90s was the revelation that the Soviets cheated over the 70s-80s, building the biggest BW program ever. Third, the Bush Admin rejected the Verification Protocol in 2001 (pre 9/11!), its first year—at the same time as it was ripping up START III, Kyoto, and the ABM Treaty. This is all to suggest that state interest, and elites’ changing conceptions of state interest, can create space for change.
[1] http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/EX1968.PDF
[2] https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/farewell-germs-us-renunciation-biological-and-toxin-warfare-1969-70
https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/627136/president-nixons-decision-to-renounce-the-us-offensive-biological-weapons-progr/