I’m unsure on what grounds the plausibility non-consequentialist theories is to be judged. Insofar as they affirm distinct premises they are thusly incommensurable, and consequently hold value only and insofar as you indeed affirm those premises. If we hypothetically assume those premises we can judge internal coherence: do the conclusions deductively follow. Historically, a non-negligible number of evaluative theories are plausible beyond their affirmation being unreasonable; they are internally coherent and somehow move us. They cannot be satisfactorily rejected independently of rejecting their major premises, but as can any theory of the historical set. Further, many highly influential candidates for judgement reject this moral rationalism: communitarianism, the later Rawls, Marxism, Habermasian discourse ethics, post-modernism, Rortyian liberal ironism, the political realism of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, the Hellenistic sceptics, emotivism, early German Romanticism, and so forth. What are we to make of this? I am rather doubtful that one can, qua utilitarian, pass independent judgement as to the relative plausibility of the constituents of the history of moral and political philosophy.
This is borne out by your, with respect, exceedingly narrow list of plausible respects in which consequentialism might be false: nearly all of which are questions internal to utilitarian theory, of the scope and weight of the levers across which aggregative value is to be distributed, notwithstanding the mild opposition of your third point. In view of the fact that utilitarianism has markedly receded in post-Rawlsian anglophone political philosophy, that most philosophy and social theory since the linguistic turn rejects its basic structure, and that for most it fails on its own intuitionism, I would like to think there are more fundamental questions to ask than ‘is agent type X a candidate for inclusion in aggregative valuation’.
To be frank, I lament the extent to which EA’s ostensible ecumenicism, facilitating charitable giving without presupposing any particular normative or otherwise grounding, quickly falls apart as soon as one interacts with the community: nearly all of whom are utilitarians, and take possession of the movement as such. That so large a proportion of discussions on this forum are ruminations on utilitariansim is indicative; but it seeps into and infects the entire identity of the movement. I think this is probably tremendously self-limiting as a social movement, and it certainly profoundly alienates me. Sometimes it seems like EA has become the latest play-thing of Oxfordian moral philosophy.
Yes, I read, appreciated and indeed commented upon it! I thought it was a welcome contribution to what is mostly a stagnant diversity in EA, and certainly not a humanistic one.
I’m unsure on what grounds the plausibility non-consequentialist theories is to be judged. Insofar as they affirm distinct premises they are thusly incommensurable, and consequently hold value only and insofar as you indeed affirm those premises. If we hypothetically assume those premises we can judge internal coherence: do the conclusions deductively follow. Historically, a non-negligible number of evaluative theories are plausible beyond their affirmation being unreasonable; they are internally coherent and somehow move us. They cannot be satisfactorily rejected independently of rejecting their major premises, but as can any theory of the historical set. Further, many highly influential candidates for judgement reject this moral rationalism: communitarianism, the later Rawls, Marxism, Habermasian discourse ethics, post-modernism, Rortyian liberal ironism, the political realism of Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, the Hellenistic sceptics, emotivism, early German Romanticism, and so forth. What are we to make of this? I am rather doubtful that one can, qua utilitarian, pass independent judgement as to the relative plausibility of the constituents of the history of moral and political philosophy.
This is borne out by your, with respect, exceedingly narrow list of plausible respects in which consequentialism might be false: nearly all of which are questions internal to utilitarian theory, of the scope and weight of the levers across which aggregative value is to be distributed, notwithstanding the mild opposition of your third point. In view of the fact that utilitarianism has markedly receded in post-Rawlsian anglophone political philosophy, that most philosophy and social theory since the linguistic turn rejects its basic structure, and that for most it fails on its own intuitionism, I would like to think there are more fundamental questions to ask than ‘is agent type X a candidate for inclusion in aggregative valuation’.
To be frank, I lament the extent to which EA’s ostensible ecumenicism, facilitating charitable giving without presupposing any particular normative or otherwise grounding, quickly falls apart as soon as one interacts with the community: nearly all of whom are utilitarians, and take possession of the movement as such. That so large a proportion of discussions on this forum are ruminations on utilitariansim is indicative; but it seeps into and infects the entire identity of the movement. I think this is probably tremendously self-limiting as a social movement, and it certainly profoundly alienates me. Sometimes it seems like EA has become the latest play-thing of Oxfordian moral philosophy.
Have you had a chance to read my post of a few days back? http://effective-altruism.com/ea/e8/dorothea_brooke_an_alternative_origin_story_for/ This was a deliberate attempt to explicitly engage a broader range of philosophical backgrounds. (I’m not sure if Tom has read it or not, or if this piece was related).
I haven’t had time to finish it yet, but I look forwards to doing so! I’ll try to comment on the relationship when I have.
Yes, I read, appreciated and indeed commented upon it! I thought it was a welcome contribution to what is mostly a stagnant diversity in EA, and certainly not a humanistic one.
So you did! Sorry, that’s what I get for replying late at night on my phone!