Your opinions might change as you take into account the full ranges of possible estimates, relative robustness, and longer-term effects. I’m pretty uncertain about the relative value of global poverty work vs. animal work, even given a non-speciesist account. See “Global poverty could be more cost-effective than animal advocacy (even for non-speciesists)” for a sketch of what I’m talking about.
The first impression though is that animal charities should be accepted as more effective until proven otherwise by some large positive AMF flow-through effect that outweighs saving a life (maybe reducing insect populations?) Until then it seems much more straightforward to donate to ACE charities, specifically the cage-free ones.
It’s a rather weak consideration though. I think I’d most rather invest in more research to figure out these comparisons.
You might also want to take longer-run effects into account, as is discussed in this article: http://globalprioritiesproject.org/2014/06/human-and-animal-interventions/
Thanks for this, hadn’t seen that link before.
One point made there is that “likely interventions in human welfare, as well as being immediately effective to relieve suffering and improve lives, also tend to have a significant long-term impact… By contrast, no analogous mechanism ensures that an improvement in the welfare of one animal results in the improvements in the welfare of other animals.” An important long-term consideration for the effects of welfare reforms is whether they generate more momentum for further reforms for animals and for expansion of the moral circle, or whether they generate complacency. I’m currently very uncertain on this, though lean slightly towards momentum. See here for relevant considerations and evidence.
Some other posts related to considering the long-term effects of animal advocacy interventions:
1) Jacy Reese, “Why I prioritize moral circle expansion over artificial intelligence alignment”
2) Me, “How tractable is changing the course of history?” (see especially some of the considerations in “How tractable are trajectory changes towards moral circle expansion?”)
3) Brian Tomasik, “Charity Cost-Effectiveness in an Uncertain World” (not necessarily specific to animal issues, but I think there is some v useful theoretical discussion)
Additional consideration to the cross-species comparison consideration:
In comparing human to animal charities, we’re often comparing human years lost (with DALYs or QALYs) to improvements in quality or years of negative life prevented. There’s lots of scope for disagreement in making these comparisons.
E.g. is a year on a factory farm worse than a year of an average human’s life is good? If so, by how many orders of magnitude? I’d guess it is worse, perhaps by an order of magnitude or more.
See here for more discussion (though it’s quite an old post and Kelly has told me she would change / update sections of it, given the time).
This is absurd. Not because human lives are necessarily inherently more valuable than other animal lives, but rather because the calculation is ridiculously unrefined and cannot be used to support the conclusion.
The idea of basing the calculation on a simple neuronal count is flat out wrong, because humans aren’t even at the top in an even, 1:1 weighting in that regard, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_animals_by_number_of_neurons . If it were that easy, the point could much more easily be made by just looking at elephant charities rather than chicken charities. It should be obvious right away from this that the argument from neuronal count is wrong.
And then, even if there is something to the idea, why arbitrarily use a square root in the calculation? Its only purpose seems to be to make the ratio closer: from 391 to 20.
And then it also assumes that there is a direct relationship between neuronal count and capacity for suffering, ignoring all other brain functions such as “thinking, memory, language, things that don’t contribute to the raw suffering that is necessary for moral worth,” which should itself appear absurd for obvious reasons.
And then there is also the basic assumption that ethics is based on suffering, which is a whole other subject (and doesn’t need to be discussed here, and is perhaps the least controversial aspect).
Any one of the aspects being wrong is enough to draw the conclusion into serious doubt, but almost the entire chain of aspects is questionable.
I think that when someone puts a number on an unknown value, the only good response is to say whether it’s too high or too low. Merely describing the uncertainty doesn’t get us anywhere closer to knowing where to donate. Animal charities could easily be better than the OP suggests.
Point taken, but look at OP’s title—it is a definitive claim, one which is not supported at all by the accompanying text. Describing the uncertainty in fact does get us somewhere, it allows one to throw out the claim. “Animal charities could easily be better than the OP suggests” indeed, but they could also be far worse.
Unless someone submits new data one way or the other though, the point is moot; which is to say, “back to the drawing board,” which is better than being led down a false path, i.e. is, again, an improvement over what was originally presented.
You can interpret “much more effective” as a claim about the expected value of a charity given current information. Personally, that’s what I think when I see such statements.
Since there are less than 1 million elephants alive today, even if each elephant has modestly more moral value than each human, elephant welfare is still very unlikely to meet the importance criteria.