Fortunately, if I remember correctly, something like the distinction between the true criterion of rightness and the best practical decision procedure actually is a major theme in the Kagan book. (Although I think the distinction probably often is underemphasized.)
It is therefore kind of misleading to think of consequentialism vs. deontology vs. virtue ethics as alternative theories, which however is the way normative ethics is typically presented in the analytic tradition.
I agree there is something to this concern. But I still wouldn’t go so far as to say that it’s misleading to think of them as alternative theories. I do think they count as conceptually distinct (even if the boundaries are sometimes a bit muddy), and I think they do sometimes have different implications for how you should in fact make moral decisions.
Beyond the deontology/consequentialism debate, I think there are also relevant questions around demandingness (how strong are our moral obligations, if any?), on the nature of well-being (e.g. hedonistic vs. preference-based vs. objective list theories), on the set of things that count as morally relevant consequences (e.g. do things beyond well-being matter? should we care more about totals or averages?), and so on.
Yeah, I think these are good points. I also suspect that many deontologists and virtue ethicists would be extremely annoyed at my claim that they aren’t alternative theories to consequentialism.
(Though I also suspect that many are somewhat annoyed at the typical way the distinctions between these types of theories are described by philosophers in a broadly consequentialist tradition. My limited experience debating with committed Kantians suggests that disagreements seem much more fundamental than “I think the right action is the one with the best consequences, and you think there are additional determinants of rightness beyond axiology”, or anything like that.)
Fortunately, if I remember correctly, something like the distinction between the true criterion of rightness and the best practical decision procedure actually is a major theme in the Kagan book. (Although I think the distinction probably often is underemphasized.)
I agree there is something to this concern. But I still wouldn’t go so far as to say that it’s misleading to think of them as alternative theories. I do think they count as conceptually distinct (even if the boundaries are sometimes a bit muddy), and I think they do sometimes have different implications for how you should in fact make moral decisions.
Beyond the deontology/consequentialism debate, I think there are also relevant questions around demandingness (how strong are our moral obligations, if any?), on the nature of well-being (e.g. hedonistic vs. preference-based vs. objective list theories), on the set of things that count as morally relevant consequences (e.g. do things beyond well-being matter? should we care more about totals or averages?), and so on.
Yeah, I think these are good points. I also suspect that many deontologists and virtue ethicists would be extremely annoyed at my claim that they aren’t alternative theories to consequentialism.
(Though I also suspect that many are somewhat annoyed at the typical way the distinctions between these types of theories are described by philosophers in a broadly consequentialist tradition. My limited experience debating with committed Kantians suggests that disagreements seem much more fundamental than “I think the right action is the one with the best consequences, and you think there are additional determinants of rightness beyond axiology”, or anything like that.)