From my memory of Reasons+Persons, Parfit does say that common-sense morality being collectively directly self-defeating refutes common-sense morality, but he doesn’t think that consequentialism being indirectly self-defeating refutes consequentialism. This is because it isn’t an aim of consequentialism that people have consequentialist temperaments, or even that they believe in consequentialism, and because any theory will be indirectly self-defeating in some circumstances (the satan thought experiment proves that).
I really like this summary, but just wanted to point this out, because the objections to common-sense morality and consequentialism were conflated in your take-away, while I think Parfit thought they were different. He claimed that his arguments refuted common-sense morality, but I don’t think he made that claim about consequentialism.
Maybe this distinction comes under the category of questions you don’t care about that much though, which is fair enough!
From my memory of Reasons+Persons, Parfit does say that common-sense morality being collectively directly self-defeating refutes common-sense morality, but he doesn’t think that consequentialism being indirectly self-defeating refutes consequentialism. This is because it isn’t an aim of consequentialism that people have consequentialist temperaments, or even that they believe in consequentialism, and because any theory will be indirectly self-defeating in some circumstances (the satan thought experiment proves that).
I really like this summary, but just wanted to point this out, because the objections to common-sense morality and consequentialism were conflated in your take-away, while I think Parfit thought they were different. He claimed that his arguments refuted common-sense morality, but I don’t think he made that claim about consequentialism.
Maybe this distinction comes under the category of questions you don’t care about that much though, which is fair enough!