An alternative minimal definition, suggested by Hilary Greaves (though the precise wording is my own), is that we could define longtermism as the view that the (intrinsic) value of an outcome is the same no matter what time it occurs.
Just to make a brief, technical (pedantic?) comment, I don’t think this definition would give you want you want. (Strict) Necessitarianism holds the only persons who matter are those who exist whatever we do. On such a view, the practical implication is, in effect, that only present people matter. The view is thus not longtermist on your chosen definition. However, Necessitarianism doesn’t discount for time per se (the discounting is contingent on time) and hence is longtermist on the quoted definition.
Nice, thanks, this is a good point. And it would pose problems for my definition too (see my clarification comment in response to Larks).
Perhaps we should include the ‘no-difference’ view as part of the definition (in addition to just permutations across times). This is an intuitive view (I think Ben Grodeck has done a survey on this among the general public), but it would make the claim quite a bit more philosophically substantive.
Or we could just not worry about Necessitarianism counting—there’ll always be some counterexamples, and if they are fringe views maybe that’s ok. And, wouldn’t someone who endorses Necessitarianism not believe (ii) of my definition? So it wouldn’t be a counterexample to my definition after all. (Though it would for Hilary’s).
(ii) Society currently privileges those who live today above those who will live in the future; and
(iii) We should take action to rectify that, and help ensure the long-run future goes well.
Do you mean Necessitarians wouldn’t accept (iii) of the above? Necessitarians will agree with (ii) and deny (iii). (Not sure if this is what you were referring to).
I’m sympathetic to Necessitarianism, but I don’t know how fringe it is. It strikes me as the most philosophically defensible population axiology that rejects long-termism which leans me towards thinking the definition shouldn’t fall foul of it. (I think Hilary’s suggestion would fall foul of it, but yours would not).
Just to make a brief, technical (pedantic?) comment, I don’t think this definition would give you want you want. (Strict) Necessitarianism holds the only persons who matter are those who exist whatever we do. On such a view, the practical implication is, in effect, that only present people matter. The view is thus not longtermist on your chosen definition. However, Necessitarianism doesn’t discount for time per se (the discounting is contingent on time) and hence is longtermist on the quoted definition.
Nice, thanks, this is a good point. And it would pose problems for my definition too (see my clarification comment in response to Larks).
Perhaps we should include the ‘no-difference’ view as part of the definition (in addition to just permutations across times). This is an intuitive view (I think Ben Grodeck has done a survey on this among the general public), but it would make the claim quite a bit more philosophically substantive.
Or we could just not worry about Necessitarianism counting—there’ll always be some counterexamples, and if they are fringe views maybe that’s ok. And, wouldn’t someone who endorses Necessitarianism not believe (ii) of my definition? So it wouldn’t be a counterexample to my definition after all. (Though it would for Hilary’s).
Do you mean Necessitarians wouldn’t accept (iii) of the above? Necessitarians will agree with (ii) and deny (iii). (Not sure if this is what you were referring to).
I’m sympathetic to Necessitarianism, but I don’t know how fringe it is. It strikes me as the most philosophically defensible population axiology that rejects long-termism which leans me towards thinking the definition shouldn’t fall foul of it. (I think Hilary’s suggestion would fall foul of it, but yours would not).