I think what you are saying is something like: if I’m certain that it’s the number of neurons which matter morally, but I’m just uncertain how many neurons this organism has, then a 2 envelope problem doesn’t apply.
Yeah, that’s a cartoon version of what I was saying.
I’m confident that utilons are what matter morally, but I’m uncertain how many utilons an insect has.
The problem is that “No, Virginia, there really is no such thing as a utilon in any non-arbitrary sense. Happiness and suffering are not actually cardinal numbers that live in the physics of the universe that we can measure. Rather, we use numbers to express how much we care about an experience.”
If moral realism were true and the moral truth were utilitarianism, then I suppose there would be a “right answer” for how many utilons a given system possessed (up to positive affine transformation). But I don’t take moral realism seriously. In the moral-realism case, the two-envelopes problem for moral uncertainty would be analogous to the ordinary two-envelopes problem, where it’s also the case that there’s a right answer. For moral non-realists, the two-envelopes problem is just a way to describe the paradox that calculations over moral uncertainty depend on one’s unit of measurement.
Okay, I think I understand now, thanks for the explanation.
For what it’s worth, the “factual” versus “moral” contrast you are drawing seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. Both the moral realist and the moral non-realist are looking for “nonarbitrary” units of measurement, and an argument that a certain unit was nonarbitrary seems like it would probably be persuasive to both the realist and the non-realist.
Well, the moral realist just assumes there exist non-arbitrary units by faith, since moral realism implies non-arbitrariness. The non-realist believes no such thing. :)
Yeah, that’s a cartoon version of what I was saying.
The problem is that “No, Virginia, there really is no such thing as a utilon in any non-arbitrary sense. Happiness and suffering are not actually cardinal numbers that live in the physics of the universe that we can measure. Rather, we use numbers to express how much we care about an experience.”
If moral realism were true and the moral truth were utilitarianism, then I suppose there would be a “right answer” for how many utilons a given system possessed (up to positive affine transformation). But I don’t take moral realism seriously. In the moral-realism case, the two-envelopes problem for moral uncertainty would be analogous to the ordinary two-envelopes problem, where it’s also the case that there’s a right answer. For moral non-realists, the two-envelopes problem is just a way to describe the paradox that calculations over moral uncertainty depend on one’s unit of measurement.
Okay, I think I understand now, thanks for the explanation.
For what it’s worth, the “factual” versus “moral” contrast you are drawing seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. Both the moral realist and the moral non-realist are looking for “nonarbitrary” units of measurement, and an argument that a certain unit was nonarbitrary seems like it would probably be persuasive to both the realist and the non-realist.
Well, the moral realist just assumes there exist non-arbitrary units by faith, since moral realism implies non-arbitrariness. The non-realist believes no such thing. :)