I would recommend this post over the GiveWell one as a case study / postmortem on charity entrepreneurship.
While it covers similar ground, the GiveWell post (which is essentially a metacommentary on this one) seemed to be written partly with the intention of reassuring donors to GiveWell that they shouldn’t update too negatively. This post felt like a more straightforward summary of Evidence Action’s decision-making process about No Lean Season.
I think this post also more clearly emphasizes the various factors that contributed to the decision to shut down the program; not just uncertainty about its impact but also the need to relaunch with a new partner, such that:
Ultimately, we determined that the opportunity cost for Evidence Action of rebuilding the program is too high relative to other opportunities we have to meet our vision of measurably improving the lives of hundreds of millions of people. Importantly, we are not saying that seasonal migration subsidies do not work or that they lack impact; rather, No Lean Season is unlikely to be among the best strategic opportunities for Evidence Action to achieve our vision.
This conclusion is also expressed in the GiveWell post, but I found it more clear here.
I would recommend this post over the GiveWell one as a case study / postmortem on charity entrepreneurship.
While it covers similar ground, the GiveWell post (which is essentially a metacommentary on this one) seemed to be written partly with the intention of reassuring donors to GiveWell that they shouldn’t update too negatively. This post felt like a more straightforward summary of Evidence Action’s decision-making process about No Lean Season.
I think this post also more clearly emphasizes the various factors that contributed to the decision to shut down the program; not just uncertainty about its impact but also the need to relaunch with a new partner, such that:
This conclusion is also expressed in the GiveWell post, but I found it more clear here.