In that case, it would IMO be better to change “total utilitarianism” to “utilitarianism” in the article. Utilitarianism is different from other forms of consequentialism in that it uses thoroughgoing aggregation. Isn’t that what Harsanyi’s theorem mainly shows? It doesn’t really add any intuitions about population ethics. Mentioning the repugnant conclusion in this context feels premature.
In that case, it would IMO be better to change “total utilitarianism” to “utilitarianism” in the article. Utilitarianism is different from other forms of consequentialism in that it uses thoroughgoing aggregation. Isn’t that what Harsanyi’s theorem mainly shows?
Hmm, it does show that it’s a linear addition of utilities (as opposed to, say, the sum of their logarithms). So I think it’s stronger than saying just “thoroughgoing aggregation”.
I’m not very familiar with the terminology here, but I remember that in this paper, Alastair Norcross used the term “thoroughgoing aggregation” for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular. That’s what I had in mind anyway, so I’m not sure I believe anything different form you. The reason I commented above was because I don’t understand the choice of “total utilitarianism” instead of just “utilitarianism.” Doesn’t every form of utilitarianism use linear addition of utilities in a case where population size remains fixed? But only total utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion. Your conclusion section IMO suggests that Harsanyi’s theorem (which takes a case where population size is indeed fixed) does something to help motivate total utilitarianism over other forms of utilitarianism, such as prior-existence utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism or average utilitarianism. You already acknowledged in your reply further above to that it doesn’t do much of that. That’s why I suggested rephrasing your conclusion section. Alternatively, you could also explain in what ways you might think the utilitarian alternatives to total utilitarianism are contrived somehow or not in line with Harsanyi’s assumptions. And probably I’m missing something about how you think about all of this, because the rest of the article seemed really excellent and clear to me. I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Alastair Norcross used the term “thoroughgoing aggregation” for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular
Ah, my mistake – I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Thanks for the suggestion – always tricky to figure out what a “straightforward” consequence is in philosophy.
I changed it to this – curious if you still find it jarring?
Total utilitarianism is a fairly controversial position. The above example where (1,1)=(2,0) can be extended to show that utilitarianism is extremely demanding, potentially requiring extreme sacrifices and inequality.
It is therefore interesting that it is the only decision procedure which does not violate one of these seemingly reasonable assumptions.
Ah, my mistake – I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
Probably I was wrong here. After reading this abstract, I realize that the way Norcross wrote about it is compatible with a weaker claim that linear aggregation of utility too. I think I just assumed that he must mean linear aggregation of utility, because everything else would seem weirdly arbitrary. :)
I changed it to this – curious if you still find it jarring?
Less so! The “total” still indicates the same conclusion I thought would be jumping the gun a bit, but if that’s your takeaway it’s certainly fine to leave it. Personally I would just write “utilitarianism” instead of “total utilitarianism.”
In that case, it would IMO be better to change “total utilitarianism” to “utilitarianism” in the article. Utilitarianism is different from other forms of consequentialism in that it uses thoroughgoing aggregation. Isn’t that what Harsanyi’s theorem mainly shows? It doesn’t really add any intuitions about population ethics. Mentioning the repugnant conclusion in this context feels premature.
Hmm, it does show that it’s a linear addition of utilities (as opposed to, say, the sum of their logarithms). So I think it’s stronger than saying just “thoroughgoing aggregation”.
I’m not very familiar with the terminology here, but I remember that in this paper, Alastair Norcross used the term “thoroughgoing aggregation” for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular. That’s what I had in mind anyway, so I’m not sure I believe anything different form you. The reason I commented above was because I don’t understand the choice of “total utilitarianism” instead of just “utilitarianism.” Doesn’t every form of utilitarianism use linear addition of utilities in a case where population size remains fixed? But only total utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion. Your conclusion section IMO suggests that Harsanyi’s theorem (which takes a case where population size is indeed fixed) does something to help motivate total utilitarianism over other forms of utilitarianism, such as prior-existence utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism or average utilitarianism. You already acknowledged in your reply further above to that it doesn’t do much of that. That’s why I suggested rephrasing your conclusion section. Alternatively, you could also explain in what ways you might think the utilitarian alternatives to total utilitarianism are contrived somehow or not in line with Harsanyi’s assumptions. And probably I’m missing something about how you think about all of this, because the rest of the article seemed really excellent and clear to me. I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Ah, my mistake – I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
Thanks for the suggestion – always tricky to figure out what a “straightforward” consequence is in philosophy.
I changed it to this – curious if you still find it jarring?
Probably I was wrong here. After reading this abstract, I realize that the way Norcross wrote about it is compatible with a weaker claim that linear aggregation of utility too. I think I just assumed that he must mean linear aggregation of utility, because everything else would seem weirdly arbitrary. :)
Less so! The “total” still indicates the same conclusion I thought would be jumping the gun a bit, but if that’s your takeaway it’s certainly fine to leave it. Personally I would just write “utilitarianism” instead of “total utilitarianism.”