Yeah, this is why I said “medium-term” rather than “near-term”. I agree that calling wild-animal welfare “neartermist” is confusing and perhaps misleading, but I think probably less so than calling it “longtermist”, given how the latter term is generally used in EA.
I’m optimistic about wild-animal welfare work achieving a lot of good over the next century or two. I don’t expect it to have major positive impact on the longrun future, except perhaps indirectly via values-spreading.
Hey Will (or anyone that sees this), if you can still see this reply, can you let me know what you think about this set arguments supporting that WAS is a longtermist issue?
The four main arguments:
I think it is quite clearly plausible to argue that what we do now will probably impact wild animals in the far future. This argument means that current WAS work can be perceived as potentially longtermist. But we have to establish WAS as a worthy longtermist issue.
In terms of potential, the number of wild animals that can exist in the future seems to far exceed the number of humans/human-like organisms that can exist in the future (but maybe lower than the potential “number” of artificial minds). This makes it seem plausible to argue that the amount of potential well-being and suffering at stake for wild animals is at least of the same order of magnitude of importance for such potential for humans/human-like organisms. This argument means that WAS is plausibly a worthy longtermist issue.
One way to view the cause area of WAS is to view it as the first stage of achieving high positive welfare for wild animals. If we have certain obligations in making future humans/human-like organisms capable of attaining more, higher, and longer positive experiences than average humans now are, it seems to me to be plausible to conceive the possibility that the correct moral theory could entail certain obligations to make non-human animals more capable of attaining positive experiences. And since the potential number of possible non-human animals that can exist seems to far exceed humans/human like organisms, it seems to me plausible to argue that such obligation is at least on the same order of magnitude to that toward humans/human-like organisms.
Notice that if one thinks that there is an obligation to create more humans/human-like organisms to experience good lives, this point is actually made stronger. You might see why this is the case later.
This argument is similar to the arguments made on value spreading made by others in this thread, but not exactly. Changing the society’s current view on WAS might have huge implications/impacts on the welfare of future artificial minds that take the form or appearance of wild animals, for example those that exist in nature/evolution simulations. It is conceivable that humanity’s current and near-future views on WAS will partially stay in the far future, and if it does it seems quite possibly catastrophic. For example, if humans continue to value the “intrinsic beauty/value” of thriving and diverse ecosystems over the suffering that happens together, or even sees the suffering as part of the “beauty”, nature simulations might be deliberately built with the suffering.
The first two arguments hinge largely on the premise that the potential number of non-human animals that can exist in the future far exceed that of humans/human-like organisms. As some of you might not agree with this, I think it might be necessary for me to explain why I think so. If you don’t disagree with this, you don’t need to read further.
First, I am only speaking of the highest potential numbers, not an expected estimate of the actual numbers. Second, I meant to separate physically existing animals and humans from digitally simulated/emulated animals and humans, because I can’t see a convincing reason why the number of digital humans will be more than animals, nor the reverse.
So why is the potential number of non-human animals higher than that of humans? Basically it is because for any planet that is habitable for humans and can be turned into human-habitable ones, it will also be extremely likely to become habitable for non-human animals. And since non-human animals can be much smaller than humans, their number potential has to be higher.
Also, after arguing for the potential number of organisms, I would like to express my view on the expected number of animals that are human/non-human: I think the expected number of physical non-human animals is (maybe substantially) higher than physical humans/human-like organisms. Four arguments makes me quite confident about this:
A. It is possible that future humans/human-like organisms would want to intentionally bring or create wild animals to terraformed planets. A 1% chance of this being true would imply more non-human animals than humans brought to life.
B. Even if humans won’t be specifically interested in bringing/creating animals, an interest in bringing or just allowing some “nature” or “wilderness” (which basically have to have at least plants) to those planets will likely spawn animals to live naturally.
C. Even if humans will be eager to prevent nature/wilderness as much as practical, some animals might still be allowed to spawn to life. For example, because they have no interest in preventing or destroying “every bit of nature” due to diligence of energy use, or because biological processes might still be perceived as one of the most efficient ways to produce certain things (such as metabolizable calories).
D. It seems likely or at least possible that humans/human-like organisms will not be the last physical animal to go extinct.
Last but not least, I have one last potential argument in reply to the view that some hold, that claims that the expected number of non-human animals will be far less than humans/human-like organisms/artificial minds (and therefore WAS is not a longtermist issue). The argument probably is better illustrated in the form of a question: Should it be the case? Regardless of what probability distribution we assign to this future scenario, whether this future scenario is ethically good/ideal/right is another question, one that we have yet to ask let alone answer. To decide now that this scenario will be the case and we will leave it as it is seems to me to be premature and irresponsible. (Part of the current WAS research agenda is to gain insights on relevant population ethics problems.)
Yeah, this is why I said “medium-term” rather than “near-term”. I agree that calling wild-animal welfare “neartermist” is confusing and perhaps misleading, but I think probably less so than calling it “longtermist”, given how the latter term is generally used in EA.
I’m optimistic about wild-animal welfare work achieving a lot of good over the next century or two. I don’t expect it to have major positive impact on the longrun future, except perhaps indirectly via values-spreading.
Hey Will (or anyone that sees this), if you can still see this reply, can you let me know what you think about this set arguments supporting that WAS is a longtermist issue?
The four main arguments:
I think it is quite clearly plausible to argue that what we do now will probably impact wild animals in the far future. This argument means that current WAS work can be perceived as potentially longtermist. But we have to establish WAS as a worthy longtermist issue.
In terms of potential, the number of wild animals that can exist in the future seems to far exceed the number of humans/human-like organisms that can exist in the future (but maybe lower than the potential “number” of artificial minds). This makes it seem plausible to argue that the amount of potential well-being and suffering at stake for wild animals is at least of the same order of magnitude of importance for such potential for humans/human-like organisms. This argument means that WAS is plausibly a worthy longtermist issue.
One way to view the cause area of WAS is to view it as the first stage of achieving high positive welfare for wild animals. If we have certain obligations in making future humans/human-like organisms capable of attaining more, higher, and longer positive experiences than average humans now are, it seems to me to be plausible to conceive the possibility that the correct moral theory could entail certain obligations to make non-human animals more capable of attaining positive experiences. And since the potential number of possible non-human animals that can exist seems to far exceed humans/human like organisms, it seems to me plausible to argue that such obligation is at least on the same order of magnitude to that toward humans/human-like organisms.
Notice that if one thinks that there is an obligation to create more humans/human-like organisms to experience good lives, this point is actually made stronger. You might see why this is the case later.
This argument is similar to the arguments made on value spreading made by others in this thread, but not exactly. Changing the society’s current view on WAS might have huge implications/impacts on the welfare of future artificial minds that take the form or appearance of wild animals, for example those that exist in nature/evolution simulations. It is conceivable that humanity’s current and near-future views on WAS will partially stay in the far future, and if it does it seems quite possibly catastrophic. For example, if humans continue to value the “intrinsic beauty/value” of thriving and diverse ecosystems over the suffering that happens together, or even sees the suffering as part of the “beauty”, nature simulations might be deliberately built with the suffering.
The first two arguments hinge largely on the premise that the potential number of non-human animals that can exist in the future far exceed that of humans/human-like organisms. As some of you might not agree with this, I think it might be necessary for me to explain why I think so. If you don’t disagree with this, you don’t need to read further.
First, I am only speaking of the highest potential numbers, not an expected estimate of the actual numbers. Second, I meant to separate physically existing animals and humans from digitally simulated/emulated animals and humans, because I can’t see a convincing reason why the number of digital humans will be more than animals, nor the reverse.
So why is the potential number of non-human animals higher than that of humans? Basically it is because for any planet that is habitable for humans and can be turned into human-habitable ones, it will also be extremely likely to become habitable for non-human animals. And since non-human animals can be much smaller than humans, their number potential has to be higher.
Also, after arguing for the potential number of organisms, I would like to express my view on the expected number of animals that are human/non-human: I think the expected number of physical non-human animals is (maybe substantially) higher than physical humans/human-like organisms. Four arguments makes me quite confident about this:
A. It is possible that future humans/human-like organisms would want to intentionally bring or create wild animals to terraformed planets. A 1% chance of this being true would imply more non-human animals than humans brought to life.
B. Even if humans won’t be specifically interested in bringing/creating animals, an interest in bringing or just allowing some “nature” or “wilderness” (which basically have to have at least plants) to those planets will likely spawn animals to live naturally.
C. Even if humans will be eager to prevent nature/wilderness as much as practical, some animals might still be allowed to spawn to life. For example, because they have no interest in preventing or destroying “every bit of nature” due to diligence of energy use, or because biological processes might still be perceived as one of the most efficient ways to produce certain things (such as metabolizable calories).
D. It seems likely or at least possible that humans/human-like organisms will not be the last physical animal to go extinct.
Last but not least, I have one last potential argument in reply to the view that some hold, that claims that the expected number of non-human animals will be far less than humans/human-like organisms/artificial minds (and therefore WAS is not a longtermist issue). The argument probably is better illustrated in the form of a question: Should it be the case? Regardless of what probability distribution we assign to this future scenario, whether this future scenario is ethically good/ideal/right is another question, one that we have yet to ask let alone answer. To decide now that this scenario will be the case and we will leave it as it is seems to me to be premature and irresponsible. (Part of the current WAS research agenda is to gain insights on relevant population ethics problems.)