nil

Karma: 284

My foremost priority is a world without severe suffering. Furthermore, I argue that we can use biotechnology to abolish involuntary and severe suffering throughout the planet.

Currently, I’m a researcher and administrator at Invincible Wellbeing. Before that, I did earning-to-give as a software engineer at the Wellcome Sanger Institute, Spark Wave, and other organisations.

Feel free to book an (informal) call w/ me if you would like to discuss suffering abolition or effective altruism more broadly: https://calendly.com/nil-ea/call-with-nil.

Views are my own.

nil 9 Jul 2018 23:11 UTC
1 point
1 ∶ 0
on: How to have cost-effective fun
I would recommend to not consume alcohol at all. (In my experience, a total abstinence is much easier than trying to not exceed a small limit.)

nil 12 Aug 2018 16:12 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
on: Current Estimates for Likelihood of X-Risk?
In Morality, Foresight, and Human Flourishing: An Introduction to Existential Risks the author Phil Torres mentions (in addition to FHI’s informal 2008 survey) that

“the philosopher John Leslie argues that we have a 30 percent chance of extinction in the next five centuries”

and that

“the cosmologist Martin Rees writes in a 2003 book that civilization has a 50-50 chance of surviving the present century.”

The book also references Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock, which is now (as of 2018) as close to “midnight” as it was in 1953.

nil 21 Nov 2018 9:46 UTC
4 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Introduction to Effective Altruism Reading List
I usually recommend Magnus Vinding’s Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others?, sometimes even to people not new to the EA ideas: the ebook is short but dense and available for free.
This book is part introduction to, part reflective examination of, the idea and ideal of effective altruism. Its aim is to examine the question: how can we best help others? A question that in turn forces us to contemplate what helping others, effectively or otherwise, really entails. Here the book argues that the greatest help we can provide is to reduce extreme suffering for all sentient beings.

nil 10 Jan 2019 18:49 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
on: What Is Effective Altruism?
Various book titles define it as Doing Good Better or The Most Good You Can Do.
Or Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others? ;)

nil 16 Feb 2019 16:46 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Cause profile: mental health
Footnote [40] is orphaned.

nil 19 Feb 2019 19:13 UTC
2 points
0 ∶ 0
on: EA Survey 2018 Series: Where People First Hear About EA and Influences on Involvement
Two formatting issues:
1. IV—Subscribers and Identifiers leads to a comment
2. VII- Group Membership should lead to https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kqTTyz7BCt6ExrfF6/ea-survey-2018-series-group-membership

nil 20 Feb 2019 17:44 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: EA Survey 2018 Series: Geographic Differences in EA
Thank you for the analysis!
Two formatting issues:
- VII- EA Group Membership links to VIII- Where People First Hear About EA and Higher Levels of Involvement
- IV—Subscribers and Identifiers links to a comment (this issue percolates from post to post)
(Please, don’t reply! =) )

nil 22 Jun 2019 12:15 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Interview with Shelley Adamo about invertebrate consciousness
Thank you for the work, Max (et al.)!
The following are some comments/questions for anyone interested.
Evolutionary theory suggests that insects will be selected to have emotions if the benefits of having them are greater than the costs of generating them. However, the costs appear to be heavy, and the benefits seem minimal.
Could anyone point me to the evidence +/- emotions being “computationally” expensive? Are emotions computations at all?
Nervous systems are very expensive for animals.
Given that we don’t know the nature of phenomenology (“Unfortunately, we don’t know how we generate emotions.”), maybe emotions (or at least simpler feelings) are energetically cheap and simple enough for evolution to select them early in the history of life? I would again appreciate relevant good literature pointers.
I do not see why robots couldn’t have an internal experience (i.e. feelings) if their artificial neural networks had functionally the same type of connections as we use to produce emotions.
If e.g. the unique valence properties of the carbon atom are part of how (phenomenally-bound) consciousness happens, then the classical artificial neural networks cannot be functionally the same in the relevant sense.
Also, how does the fact that digital computations are interpretation-depended affect the possibility of digital consciousness? (A tangentially relevant paper worth sharing is Universe creation on a computer by Gordon McCabe.)
The human brain is the ‘swiss army knife’ of brains; we can use our cognition to do almost anything. We are not especially speedy, but we can build cars. We’re not great swimmers (like a dolphin), but we can build boats. We can’t fly, but we can build planes.
We as a distributed “intelligence”, yes. One human cannot do these things. I find this quote from Magnus Vinding’s Reflections on Intelligence illuminating on the (off-)topic:
“Human intelligence” is often compared to “chimpanzee intelligence” in a manner that presents the former as being so much more awesome than, and different from, the latter. Yet this is not the case. If we look at individuals in isolation, a human is hardly that much more capable than a chimpanzee. They are both equally unable to read and write on their own, not to mention building computers or flying to the moon. And this is also true if we compare a tribe of, say, thirty humans with a tribe of thirty chimpanzees. Such two tribes rule the Earth about equally little. What really separates humans from chimpanzees, however, is that humans have a much greater capacity for accumulating information, especially through language. And it is this – more precisely, millions of individuals cooperating with this, in itself humble and almost useless, ability – that enables humans to accomplish the things we erroneously identify with individual abilities: communicating with language, doing mathematics, uncovering physical laws, building things, etc. It is essentially this you can do with a human that you cannot do with a chimpanzee: train them to contribute modestly to society. To become a well-connected neuron in the collective human brain. Without the knowledge and tools of previous generations, humans are largely indistinguishable from chimpanzees.

nil 8 Aug 2019 12:18 UTC
8 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Interview with Michael Tye about invertebrate consciousness
Thank you for doing this, Max (and the supporters). These are good questions that warrant their own book =)

I find this passage making a particularly good point, so I quote it below for those skipped that part:

In the case of hermit crabs, we find the relevant behavioral pattern. So, we may infer that, like us, they feel pain. To be sure, they have many fewer neurons. But why should we think that makes a difference to the presence of pain? It didn’t make any difference with respect to the complex pattern of behavior the crabs display in response to noxious stimuli. Why should it make any difference with respect to the cause of that behavior? It might, of course. There is no question of proof here. But that isn’t enough to overturn the inference.

We need to look more closely at invertebrate behavior and see whether and how much it matches ours with respect to a range of experiences—bodily, perceptual and emotional.

Comparing with humans, I suppose, should come with many caveats. Still, for ancient(?) feelings like fear and pain, the approach seems valid to my layman perspective in the area.

Of course, if one endorsed a type identity theory for conscious mental states, according to which experiences are one and the same as specific physico-chemical brain states, that would give one a reason to deny that digital beings lacked consciousness. But why accept the type identity theory? Given the diversity of sentient organisms in nature, it is extremely implausible to hold that for each type of experience, there is a single type of brain state with which it is identical.

If (globally bound) consciousness is “implemented” on a lower level, then it still may be possible for different physico-chemical brain states for the same qualia to be relevantly identical on that lower level. I mention this because IMO there are good reasons to be sceptical about digital consciousness.

[...] it is is extremely implausible to hold that [...]

A typo

nil 3 Dec 2019 23:07 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Eight high-level uncertainties about global catastrophic and existential risk
1. Expected value of the future
I just wanted to mention the possibility of so-called suffering risks or s-risks, which IMO should loom large in our trying to meaningfully assess the expected value of the future. (Although, even if the future is negative on some assessment, it may still be better to avert x-risks to preserve intelligence and promote compassion for intense suffering in the expectation that the intelligence will guard against suffering that would re-emerge in the absence of the intelligence (the way it “emerged” in the past).)

nil 26 Dec 2019 20:35 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
on: Genetic Enhancement as a Cause Area
Thanks for bringing up the topic!

In the long term, I believe selecting embryos for favorable traits will happen anyway, regardless of ethical qualms, because once the technology has been demonstrated, countries unwilling to adopt it will risk falling far behind.

Another reason how selecting embryos may become a norm is that, as the technology matures, parents will eventually have a choice to have at least a slightly higher hedonic set-point for their children. Why would they choose not to have happier children? Presumably, more positive children are more fun to raise and are expected to be successful in life. So, over time, psychological pain may be genetically eliminated / reduced. See perhaps this line of argument in David Pearce’s The Reproductive Revolution.

Also, “short-term” improvement in well-being can be seen as the long-termist’s goal too, as WMD, which are expected to be much more available in future, are arguably less likely to be used by “life lovers”.

nil 27 Dec 2019 14:37 UTC
2 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: ishi’s comment on: Genetic Enhancement as a Cause Area

[...] UBI as a cause I think may rank above genetic enhancement [...]

I would counter that genetic enhancement would be the only cause that could address the root problem—the biology of suffering itself. Environmental interventions, in contrast, are ultimately limited by the “hedonic treadmill” effect (that is not to say, of course, that the worst cases like factory farming and extreme poverty should not be solved ASAP).

nil 22 Mar 2020 20:32 UTC
2 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Surveying attitudes towards helping wild animals among scientists and students
It can be insightful to read the particular obstacles (found in the full report in Results) scholars and students thought of to the three interventions.

(Similarly for the previous, qualitative study: as a comment to that previous report says, “Those quotes capture elements of the interviewees’ thinking that are difficult to summarize.”)

nil 22 Mar 2020 20:36 UTC
1 point
0 ∶ 0
on: Scientists’ attitudes towards improving the welfare of animals in the wild: a qualitative study

The study can be downloaded here

The link to the full report is missing.

nil 30 Mar 2020 22:08 UTC
4 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Tips for overcoming low back pain
What worked in my case (of lower back pain that I had suffered for many years starting from a high-school on) is standing 90-95% of my working time (at an improvised standing desk, and an adjustable one at my last job). (I exercised in both cases, although those included mostly push ups, running, and, most helpfully, pulling up.)

nil 31 Mar 2020 16:48 UTC
9 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Launching Utilitarianism.net: An Introductory Online Textbook on Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism (NU) isn’t mentioned anywhere on the website, AFAIS. This ethical view has quite a few supporters among thinkers, and unlike classical utilitarianism (CU) NU appears satiable (“maximize happiness” vs “minimize misery”). There are subtypes like weak NU (lexical NU and lexical threshold NU), consent-based NU, and perhaps OPIS’ “xNU+”.

Are there reasons for the omission?

nil 1 Apr 2020 12:43 UTC
4 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: richard_ngo’s comment on: Launching Utilitarianism.net: An Introductory Online Textbook on Utilitarianism
Good point. Thank you.

Even classical utilitarianism can belong to the umbrella term of suffering-focused ethics if its supporters agree that we should still focus on reducing suffering in practice (for its neglectedness, relative easiness of prevention, as a common ground with other ethical views, etc).

nil 8 Apr 2020 16:12 UTC
7 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Intro to Consciousness + QRI Reading List
Thanks for crossposting the list on the Forum.

The 1st recommendation (Consciousness Realism: The Non-Eliminativist Physicalist View of Consciousness by Magnus Vinding) touches on the limits of physical simulations (:

More generally, there is no guarantee that a simulation of something, no matter how much information it includes of that something, will have the same properties as the thing being simulated. [...]

).

For those who may be interested in the topic, consider Gordon McCabe’s Universe creation on a computer. The paper elaborates on the limits of (digital) simulations of physical systems, bringing, IMO, healthy skepticism about the simulation hypothesis (and thus about the possibility of “simulated” minds).

some concerns with classical utilitarianism

nil14 Nov 2020 9:29 UTC

31 points

17 comments19 min readEA link

nil 14 Nov 2020 21:52 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 0
on: Physical theories of consciousness reduce to panpsychism
Thanks for writing the post!

Since you write:

… I’m not claiming panpsychism is true, although this significantly increases my credence in it …

I’m curious what is your relative credence in non-materialist, “idealistic” physicalism if you’re familiar with it? One contemporary account I’m most familiar with is David Pearce’s “physicalistic idealism” (“an experimentally testable conjecture” that “that reality is fundamentally experiential and that the natural world is exhaustively described by the equations of physics and their solutions”) (see also Pearce’s popular explanation of his views in a Quora post). David Hoffman’s “Consciousness Realism” would be another example (I haven’t looked deeply into his work).

One can argue that idealistic physicalism is more parsimonious (by being a monistic physicalism) and thus more likely to be true(r) than panpsychism (which assumes property dualism). Panpsychism, on the other hand, may be more intuitive and more familiar to researchers these days, which may explain why it’s discussed more(?) these days compared to non-materialist physicalism.

nil

some con­cerns with clas­si­cal utilitarianism

some concerns with classical utilitarianism