It is worth noting the portfolio approach corresponding to worldview diversification applies to the allocation of resources of the community as a whole, as far as I understand.
It does? Says who? And why does it? Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approach—despite it being appealed to in decision-making for many years—it strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood. I see moral uncertainty as asking a first-personal question—what should I do, given my beliefs about morality?
I also wonder whether GiveWell’s moral weights being majorly determined by its donors (60 %) has the intention of capturing other effects besides those directly related to the death of the person
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
The decision of which interventions to support depends on their marginal cost-effectiveness, which in turn depends on the amount of resources invested in the interventions globally, not just by me.
Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approach—despite it being appealed to in decision-making for many years—it strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood.
I agree the worldview diversification approach is quite ad hoc, and I much prefer the softmax approach suggested here by Jan Kulveit and Gavin Leech.
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
I think it is useful to understand the reasoning behind certain assumptions (e.g. giving large weight to donors’ moral weights), because they may inform our own analyses. However, one should still question whether the reasoning makes sense.
It does? Says who? And why does it? Given that attempts there have been, as far as I can tell, almost nil attempts to think through the worldview diversification approach—despite it being appealed to in decision-making for many years—it strikes me as an open question about how it should be understood. I see moral uncertainty as asking a first-personal question—what should I do, given my beliefs about morality?
Ah, I too used to spend many hours wondering what GiveWell really thought about things. But now I am a man, I have put away such childish things.
Hi Michael,
Thanks for the reply!
The decision of which interventions to support depends on their marginal cost-effectiveness, which in turn depends on the amount of resources invested in the interventions globally, not just by me.
I agree the worldview diversification approach is quite ad hoc, and I much prefer the softmax approach suggested here by Jan Kulveit and Gavin Leech.
I think it is useful to understand the reasoning behind certain assumptions (e.g. giving large weight to donors’ moral weights), because they may inform our own analyses. However, one should still question whether the reasoning makes sense.