I believe NK people would likely disagree with this conclusion, even if they were not being coerced to do so.
I don’t have good intuitions on this, it doesn’t seem absurd to me.
Unrelated to NK, many people suffer immensely from terminal illnesses, but we still deny them the right to assisted suicide. For very good reasons, we have extremely strong biases against actively killing people, even when their lives are clearly net negative.
So yes, I think it’s plausible that many humans living in extreme poverty or under totalitarian regimes are experiencing extremely negative net utility, and under some ethical systems, that implies that it would be a net good to let them die.
That doesn’t mean we should promote policies that kill North Korean people or stop giving humanitarian food and medical aid.
I tend to agree that there are lives (human or not) not worth living, but my point is that it’s very difficult to consistently identify them by using my only own preference ordering. Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.”
(I’m assuming we’re not taking into account externalities and opportunity costs. An adult male lion’s seems pretty comfortable and positive, but it entails huge costs for other animals)
It’s even harder if you have to take into account the perspectives of the interested parties. For instance, in the example we’re discussing, SK people could also complain that your utility function implied that preventing one NK birth is equal to saving 10 SK lives. Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.
Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.”
Can you clarify?
Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.
I don’t know what they would find implausible. To me it seems plausible.
Unrelated to NK, many people suffer immensely from terminal illnesses, but we still deny them the right to assisted suicide. For very good reasons, we have extremely strong biases against actively killing people, even when their lives are clearly net negative.
So yes, I think it’s plausible that many humans living in extreme poverty or under totalitarian regimes are experiencing extremely negative net utility, and under some ethical systems, that implies that it would be a net good to let them die.
That doesn’t mean we should promote policies that kill North Korean people or stop giving humanitarian food and medical aid.
I tend to agree that there are lives (human or not) not worth living, but my point is that it’s very difficult to consistently identify them by using my only own preference ordering. Saying “I’d rather die than live like that” is distinct from “this is worse than non-existence.” (I’m assuming we’re not taking into account externalities and opportunity costs. An adult male lion’s seems pretty comfortable and positive, but it entails huge costs for other animals) It’s even harder if you have to take into account the perspectives of the interested parties. For instance, in the example we’re discussing, SK people could also complain that your utility function implied that preventing one NK birth is equal to saving 10 SK lives. Even the implication that moving a NK person to SK is better than saving 10 SK lives is sort of implausible—for both NKs and SKs alike.