thanks for the comment. My theory mostly violates that neutrality principle: all else equal, adding a person to the world who has a negative welfare is bad, adding a person who has a welfare higher than treshold T is good, and in its lexical extension, adding a person with welfare between 0 and threshold T, is good (the lexical extension says that if two states are equally good when it comes to the total welfare excluding the welfare of possible people between 0 and T, then the state that has the highest total welfare, including that of all possible people, is the best).
There is indeed an apparent intransitivity in my theory, which is not a real or serious intransitivity, as it is avoided in the same way as that dynamic inconsistency is avoided, namely by considering the choise sets. So, worlds A, B and C are equally good when you consider the full choice set {A,B,C}, but once that extra person is added, the choice set reduces to {B,C}, and then C is better than B (the extra person becomes a necessary person in choice set {B,C}). The crucial thing is that the ‘better than’ relationship depends on the choice set, the set of all available states. This excludes the serious ‘money pump’ intransitivities. In the full choice set {A,B,C}, I am indifferent between A and B, so I’m willing to switch from A to B. Now I prefer C over B (because that extra person has a higher welfare in C), and hence I’m willing to pay to switch from B to C. But as the choice set is now reduced to {B,C}, after choosing C, I can no longer switch back to A, even if I was initially indifferent between C and A. In the lexical extension of my theory, I would end up with world C.
Hi Kevin,
thanks for the comment. My theory mostly violates that neutrality principle: all else equal, adding a person to the world who has a negative welfare is bad, adding a person who has a welfare higher than treshold T is good, and in its lexical extension, adding a person with welfare between 0 and threshold T, is good (the lexical extension says that if two states are equally good when it comes to the total welfare excluding the welfare of possible people between 0 and T, then the state that has the highest total welfare, including that of all possible people, is the best).
There is indeed an apparent intransitivity in my theory, which is not a real or serious intransitivity, as it is avoided in the same way as that dynamic inconsistency is avoided, namely by considering the choise sets. So, worlds A, B and C are equally good when you consider the full choice set {A,B,C}, but once that extra person is added, the choice set reduces to {B,C}, and then C is better than B (the extra person becomes a necessary person in choice set {B,C}). The crucial thing is that the ‘better than’ relationship depends on the choice set, the set of all available states. This excludes the serious ‘money pump’ intransitivities. In the full choice set {A,B,C}, I am indifferent between A and B, so I’m willing to switch from A to B. Now I prefer C over B (because that extra person has a higher welfare in C), and hence I’m willing to pay to switch from B to C. But as the choice set is now reduced to {B,C}, after choosing C, I can no longer switch back to A, even if I was initially indifferent between C and A. In the lexical extension of my theory, I would end up with world C.
Thanks! Makes sense.