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In­tu­ition of neutrality

TagLast edit: 17 May 2021 14:03 UTC by Pablo

The intuition of neutrality is the view in population ethics that, roughly, adding a person to the population is in itself ethically neutral. More precisely, the view states that adding a person whose lifetime wellbeing falls within a certain positive range makes the world neither intrinsically better nor intrinsically worse (Broome 2004).

Bibliography

Broome, John (2000) Cost‐benefit analysis and population, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 29, pp. 953–970.

Broome, John (2004) Weighing Lives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Narveson, Jan (1973) Moral problems of population, Monist, vol. 57, pp. 62–86.

Rabinowicz, Włodek (2009) Broome and the intuition of neutrality, Philosophical Issues, vol. 19, pp. 389–411.

Related entries

person-affecting views | population ethics

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