The intuition of neutrality is the view in population ethics that, roughly, adding a person to the population is in itself ethically neutral. More precisely, the view states that adding a person whose lifetime wellbeing falls within a certain positive range makes the world neither intrinsically better nor intrinsically worse.[1]
Further reading
Broome, John (2000) Cost‐benefit analysis and population, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 29, pp. 953–970.
Narveson, Jan (1973) Moral problems of population, Monist, vol. 57, pp. 62–86.
Rabinowicz, Włodek (2009) Broome and the intuition of neutrality, Philosophical Issues, vol. 19, pp. 389–411.
Related entries
person-affecting views | population ethics
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Broome, John (2004) Weighing Lives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.