To add to this comment, I grew up in a vegan household, and one of my mothers runs the local vegan society in the city where I grew up. Ever since I can remember, education about vegan health and nutrition has been a central point to broach in vegan advocacy, and nobody that I’ve encountered in various vegan (non-EA) communities throughout my life have been any different (note that I’ve had a lot of exposure to such groups, in many different countries & cultures). For example, most of the free leaflets on the website of my mother’s vegan society website are concerned with vegan health, and while the leaflets have changed over the years, they’ve always sought to promote healthy methods of dietary transition.
I think veganism is a good thing for EA to promote, and I think the fact that most EAs are vegan or support veganism is central to the movement’s non-speciesist agenda. EA may indeed have a problem with not providing relevant information concerning vegan health and nutrition—especially to newcomers—and I agree that this is something that should be emphasized. At the same time, I disagree that veganism necessarily entails health trade-offs; this is likely true for some, but I think that most people could transition to a vegan diet without preparation and not suffer for it (primarily because of how nutritionally enriched modern food products are).
(N=1: I’ve never eaten animal products, and would place myself in the 95th percentile regarding my personal health & well-being, if its relevant to your analysis of vegan EAs)
My understanding is that functionalist theories are characterized by their implicit ontological assumption that p-consciousness is an abstract entity; namely, a function. But “there are multiple ways to physically realize any (Turing-level) computation, and multiple ways to interpret a physical realization as computation, and no privileged way to choose between them” (Johnson, 2024, p.5). If a functionalist theory identifies an abstract entity that can only be implemented within a particular physical substrate (e.g., quantum theories of consciousness) then you solve the reality mapping problem (cf. Johnson, 2016, p.61). But most functionalist theories are not physically constrained in this way; a theory which identifies function p as sufficient for consciousness has to be open to p being realized within any physical system where the relevant causal mappings are preserved (both brains and silicone chips). EM field theories of consciousness are an elegant solution to the phenomenal binding problem precisely because there already exists a physical mechanism for drawing nontrivial boundaries between two conscious experiences: topological segmentation.