If X would have a bad life, were X to exist, I take it we shouldn’t create X.
Yes, because in the outcome where X exists, they would have a claim to not exist (by my assumption), so this would have been a mistake, and you would want to undo the choice, if you could. Therefore, it’s not a rational choice to make.
But then why, if X were to have a good life, were X to exist, do we not to have reason to create X?
Not from a situation in which X does not and will not exist, as a person-affecting rule (my claim), since X would not exist to be able to have such a claim. So, if you chose for X not to exist, then you would have no reason to change your mind, since X will not be around to give you such a reason. If you did choose for X to exist (whether or not they exist yet), this would give you a reason to not change your mind, but this reason does not apply if you’d have already chosen otherwise, so your choice to not bring X into existence would be stable; you wouldn’t change your mind. See also my discussion with Stijn.
You say you’re ‘agnostic’ about whether those who would have good lives have an interest in existing, but I don’t think you give a reason for this agnosticism, which would be the crucial thing to do.
This is just my personal view, since I’m uncertain about the matter, and the argument goes through either way. That those who would have a good life have an interest in existing is compatible with some of the example theories I gave, including even consequentialist theories that always assign a negative value to new individuals, all else equal.
Second, I didn’t really understand the explication of Meacham’s view—you said it ‘solves’ a cavalcade of issues on pop ethics but didn’t spell out how it actually solves them. I’m also not sure if your view is different from Meacham’s and, if so, how.
I didn’t plan to explain all of that, since it was just a brief overview and a reason for readers to check out the paper themselves.
Meacham’s system is a full utilitarian calculus, and so can be taken to be a full ethical system. What I present here is just an argument that could defend or motivate parts of the design choices in his system, e.g. that in an outcome in which an individual doesn’t exist, the harm to them is 0.
Third, it would be useful if you could spell out what you take (some of) the practical implications of your view to be.
That’s a good point. There’s a lot that will depend on what other views you hold, but I think broadly, the views would be more present-focused with a narrow person-affecting view, and generally more suffering-focused (including future suffering) with a wide or narrow person-affecting view. They would probably reject the astronomical waste argument, so human extinction or slowed population growth could only look bad instrumentally, and may even look good, although this depends on empirical views about whether our presence would be useful for others.
If we use a wide person-affecting view and also accept empty individualism (and the independence of irrelevant alternatives), then our comparison of outcomes is basically strong negative utilitarianism, although it need not aggregate through a sum.
If instead we take a narrow person-affecting view, then there’s still reason to prevent bad lives in the future, but we can’t make future individuals better off otherwise, since they’d be different individuals. So, we might focus on individuals alive today, as well as future bad lives only to prevent their existence, since we wouldn’t be able to make future bad lives better otherwise.
If, on top of the narrow view, we also accept empty individualism, then we can’t make individuals who exist now better off either, and the only good we can do for anyone is prevent them from existing. We would focus only on preventing bad individual person-moments.
I’d need to think more about whether there are further important practical implications beyond just those implied by the Procreation Asymmetry.
Fourth, because you get stuck into the deep end quite quickly, I wonder if you should add a note that this is a relatively more ‘advanced’ forum post.
I was actually hoping it would be fairly accessible, because I think a lot of EAs might be committed to a totalist view without having thought much about arguments for the alternatives, even if they might have found the Procreation Asymmetry intuitive before.
Yes, because in the outcome where X exists, they would have a claim to not exist (by my assumption), so this would have been a mistake, and you would want to undo the choice, if you could. Therefore, it’s not a rational choice to make.
Not from a situation in which X does not and will not exist, as a person-affecting rule (my claim), since X would not exist to be able to have such a claim. So, if you chose for X not to exist, then you would have no reason to change your mind, since X will not be around to give you such a reason. If you did choose for X to exist (whether or not they exist yet), this would give you a reason to not change your mind, but this reason does not apply if you’d have already chosen otherwise, so your choice to not bring X into existence would be stable; you wouldn’t change your mind. See also my discussion with Stijn.
This is just my personal view, since I’m uncertain about the matter, and the argument goes through either way. That those who would have a good life have an interest in existing is compatible with some of the example theories I gave, including even consequentialist theories that always assign a negative value to new individuals, all else equal.
I didn’t plan to explain all of that, since it was just a brief overview and a reason for readers to check out the paper themselves.
Meacham’s system is a full utilitarian calculus, and so can be taken to be a full ethical system. What I present here is just an argument that could defend or motivate parts of the design choices in his system, e.g. that in an outcome in which an individual doesn’t exist, the harm to them is 0.
That’s a good point. There’s a lot that will depend on what other views you hold, but I think broadly, the views would be more present-focused with a narrow person-affecting view, and generally more suffering-focused (including future suffering) with a wide or narrow person-affecting view. They would probably reject the astronomical waste argument, so human extinction or slowed population growth could only look bad instrumentally, and may even look good, although this depends on empirical views about whether our presence would be useful for others.
If we use a wide person-affecting view and also accept empty individualism (and the independence of irrelevant alternatives), then our comparison of outcomes is basically strong negative utilitarianism, although it need not aggregate through a sum.
If instead we take a narrow person-affecting view, then there’s still reason to prevent bad lives in the future, but we can’t make future individuals better off otherwise, since they’d be different individuals. So, we might focus on individuals alive today, as well as future bad lives only to prevent their existence, since we wouldn’t be able to make future bad lives better otherwise.
If, on top of the narrow view, we also accept empty individualism, then we can’t make individuals who exist now better off either, and the only good we can do for anyone is prevent them from existing. We would focus only on preventing bad individual person-moments.
I’d need to think more about whether there are further important practical implications beyond just those implied by the Procreation Asymmetry.
I was actually hoping it would be fairly accessible, because I think a lot of EAs might be committed to a totalist view without having thought much about arguments for the alternatives, even if they might have found the Procreation Asymmetry intuitive before.