Executive summary: The author argues for “moral nihilism” in a neutral sense—denying moral facts—and further claims that morality itself is harmful enough that we should adopt “moral abolitionism,” keeping concern for welfare and interests while abandoning moral language and categorical “oughts.”
Key points:
The author claims effective altruists are often moral anti-realists, citing an EA Forum survey with 312 votes skewed toward anti-realism and suggesting the framing likely biased toward realism.
They argue that even if there are no moral facts, pleasures and pains, preferences, and what is better or worse “from their own point of view” still exist, so effective altruists can aim to promote interests without committing to moral realism.
The author contends morality can create complacency by widening the perceived gap between permissible and impermissible actions, and may sometimes encourage harm by licensing indifference so long as rights aren’t violated.
They distinguish multiple senses of “moral nihilism,” and defend a combined view: second-order moral error theory plus first-order “moral eliminativism/abolitionism” that recommends ceasing to use moral language and thought.
They argue a Humean instrumentalist account of reasons cannot justify categorical imperatives, so claims like “You ought not to torture babies” “full stop” systematically fail, leading to the conclusion that “x is never under a moral obligation.”
The author claims morality’s “objectification of values” inflames disputes, blocks compromise, and has been used to rationalize large-scale harms, and they argue abolishing moral talk would not require abolishing care or pro-social emotions.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, andcontact us if you have feedback.
Executive summary: The author argues for “moral nihilism” in a neutral sense—denying moral facts—and further claims that morality itself is harmful enough that we should adopt “moral abolitionism,” keeping concern for welfare and interests while abandoning moral language and categorical “oughts.”
Key points:
The author claims effective altruists are often moral anti-realists, citing an EA Forum survey with 312 votes skewed toward anti-realism and suggesting the framing likely biased toward realism.
They argue that even if there are no moral facts, pleasures and pains, preferences, and what is better or worse “from their own point of view” still exist, so effective altruists can aim to promote interests without committing to moral realism.
The author contends morality can create complacency by widening the perceived gap between permissible and impermissible actions, and may sometimes encourage harm by licensing indifference so long as rights aren’t violated.
They distinguish multiple senses of “moral nihilism,” and defend a combined view: second-order moral error theory plus first-order “moral eliminativism/abolitionism” that recommends ceasing to use moral language and thought.
They argue a Humean instrumentalist account of reasons cannot justify categorical imperatives, so claims like “You ought not to torture babies” “full stop” systematically fail, leading to the conclusion that “x is never under a moral obligation.”
The author claims morality’s “objectification of values” inflames disputes, blocks compromise, and has been used to rationalize large-scale harms, and they argue abolishing moral talk would not require abolishing care or pro-social emotions.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.