I think these unsavory implications you enumerate are just a consequence of applying game theory to donations, rather than following specifically from my postâs arguments.
For example, if Bob is all-in on avoiding funging and doesnât care about norms like collaboration and transparency, his incentives are exactly as you describe: Give zero information about his value system, and make donations secretly after other funders have shown their hands.
I think youâre completely right that those are awful norms, and we shouldnât go all-in on applying game theory to donations. This goes both for avoiding funging and for my postâs argument about optimizing âEAâs portfolioâ.
However, just as we can learn important lessons from the concept of funging while discouraging the bad, I still think this post is valuable and includes some nontrivial practical recommendations.
I think these unsavory implications you enumerate are just a consequence of applying game theory to donations, rather than following specifically from my postâs arguments.
For example, if Bob is all-in on avoiding funging and doesnât care about norms like collaboration and transparency, his incentives are exactly as you describe: Give zero information about his value system, and make donations secretly after other funders have shown their hands.
I think youâre completely right that those are awful norms, and we shouldnât go all-in on applying game theory to donations. This goes both for avoiding funging and for my postâs argument about optimizing âEAâs portfolioâ.
However, just as we can learn important lessons from the concept of funging while discouraging the bad, I still think this post is valuable and includes some nontrivial practical recommendations.