Thanks for writing this up! I disagree for a few reasons:
This feels more like a problem at the point between āalternative proteins have scaled up and weāve replaced a bunch of meatā and āthis results in a meat ban.ā It seems possible to me that moral advocacy efforts can happen after alternative proteins have scaled up, but before there are laws to stop factory farming for food entirely. I donāt think alternative proteins replacing, say, 80% of meat will result in people thinking non-meat uses of animals is morally okay in a lock-in kind of way.
I think a lot of peopleās moral reasoning about animals is posthoc/ābased on cognitive dissonance. That is, people like eating meat, or itās a valuable part of their culture, and their moral intuitions around animal exploitation are built around that. So it seems plausible to me that moral advocacy efforts become substantially more effective if weāre able to quickly replace one of the biggest uses of animals.
Iām not sure Iām compelled by the mechanism for lock-in. One mechanism appears to be overconfidence/ācomplacency as a society, which reduces the drive toward moral progress. This seems somewhat plausible, but it feels like this is possible to solve (for instance, animal advocacy organizations pivot toward other uses of animals, and are more able to dedicate resources focused on animal advocacy). Another mechanism seems to be that āletting automobiles replace horses as practical transport instead of listening to the horse advocates and becoming better humans, humanity has lost a great opportunity to do something for the animals for moral reasons, and do so by accepting an economic loss.ā But I guess Iām not sure why ā in either the horse case or the factory farming case ā this is a unique opportunity. I donāt think the existence of factory farming necessarily strengthens the argument, to an average person, about the urgency of animal advocacy, because if people donāt buy the moral reasoning for caring about animals, Iām not sure the scale of suffering that exists currently affects whether they buy the moral reasoning. So in the case of horses, for example, I donāt think it was easier to convince people that horses matter before they were replaced as practical transport.
I feel like this is just intractable. Meat has the advantage of being embedded in culture and identity for generations. Without proposing any alternative, and going entirely through the moral route, means going up against this generational idea that eating meat is okay. Success seems hard. Iām wary of taking such a risk, when thereās also the possibility of factory farming for food persisting into the future (and Iād guess, in business-as-usual scenarios, it remains a bigger problem than other kinds of factory farming). I will also say Iām not convinced that expanding our moral circle to animals helps expand our moral circle to things like digital minds in the far future, though thatās a conversation for another day.
Iām uncomfortable about this argument for nonconsequentialist reasons. If factory farming is a grave injustice that ought be abolished (even if youāre a consequentialist who buys moral uncertainty), it seems like letting it stay for much longer and taking a huge risk that it stays forever because you want to do it for the right reasons could be a massive negligent injustice in itself. It feels like, in a moral way, saying āitās bad to hire more beat cops to deter crime, because deterring crime through fear doesnāt convince anyone that their crime is wrong.ā One reason a lot of people would find that intuitively bad is because it feels like itās instrumentalizing the victims of crime for a dubious future consequence.
I think a lot of peopleās moral reasoning about animals is posthoc/ābased on cognitive dissonance. That is, people like eating meat, or itās a valuable part of their culture, and their moral intuitions around animal exploitation are built around that. So it seems plausible to me that moral advocacy efforts become substantially more effective if weāre able to quickly replace one of the biggest uses of animals.
Tobias also mentioned this. I am adding this to the counterargument. I wasnāt convinced enough when Tobias mentioned it. But your mention of the 80% (or other points that can count as near success) point is relevant here. It seems hopeful that we can replace 80% of FFFF, and reduce peopleās cognitive dissonance from there.
I feel like this is just intractable. Meat has the advantage of being embedded in culture and identity for generations. Without proposing any alternative, and going entirely through the moral route, means going up against this generational idea that eating meat is okay. Success seems hard. Iām wary of taking such a risk, when thereās also the possibility of factory farming for food persisting into the future (and Iād guess, in business-as-usual scenarios, it remains a bigger problem than other kinds of factory farming). I will also say Iām not convinced that expanding our moral circle to animals helps expand our moral circle to things like digital minds in the far future, though thatās a conversation for another day.
I agree that without any alternatives the change is hard even for hardcore moral changers, thatās a great point and a great reminder.
Iām not sure Iām compelled by the mechanism for lock-in.
Me neither, I am literally throwing my intuitions to be critiqued, hopefully bringing out, or rejecting, a potential crucial consideration.
So in the case of horses, for example, I donāt think it was easier to convince people that horses matter before they were replaced as practical transport.
I agree with this. But my point in the post was that by losing the opportunity to slowly do the horse advocacy, it was kind of a lock-in. And I intuitively think that it is plausible that if automobiles were invented later, and horse advocacy was given time to succeed, maybe factory farming wonāt be born.
And itās relevant to the 80% point. There was virtually no such point for the horses. It happened so quick that the horse advocates have no time to do āposthoc advocacyā.
Iām uncomfortable about this argument for nonconsequentialist reasons. If factory farming is a grave injustice that ought be abolished (even if youāre a consequentialist who buys moral uncertainty), it seems like letting it stay for much longer and taking a huge risk that it stays forever because you want to do it for the right reasons could be a massive negligent injustice in itself. It feels like, in a moral way, saying āitās bad to hire more beat cops to deter crime, because deterring crime through fear doesnāt convince anyone that their crime is wrong.ā One reason a lot of people would find that intuitively bad is because it feels like itās instrumentalizing the victims of crime for a dubious future consequence.
Interesting. I think I am nudged a bit by your point. (I endorse moral uncertainty).
I agree with Tejasā comment, particularly the second point. As a social psychologist, cognitive dissonance is exactly what I would cite too. Reducing the disparity between attitudes and behaviour by any means (such as increasing plant-based eating for health reasons) leaves the mental space to either learn about moral reasons without the same degree of defensiveness ORāeven better and fairly likely in my opinionāstart adopting moral reasons without even any external influence. At least in western societies, the moral reasons for going vegan are pretty well-known, so motivated reasoning may work in our favour over time. Reducetarians may look at their behaviour and ādecideā subconsciously that it was partially motivated by moral reasons because that makes them feel like a good personā¦ which then encourages them to make further changes on moral grounds.
It seems possible to me that moral advocacy efforts can happen after alternative proteins have scaled up, but before there are laws to stop factory farming for food entirely.
I find this very interesting! And I tend to agree.Inspired by you, it looks to me that a solution to my worry, if there is a justified worry at all, is to start advocating for a ban on FFFF, when itās nearly (i.e. 80%), but not yet, obsolete. And this view means that we should still try to speed up alt-pro!
I donāt think alternative proteins replacing, say, 80% of meat will result in people thinking non-meat uses of animals is morally okay in a lock-in kind of way.
Just to be clear, the lock-in I am referring to is losing the only opportunity to use moral reasons to eliminate FFFF. I still hold the view that if alt-pro just suddenly replace FFFF, we will miss on a golden opportunity to replace what might turn out to be the easiest kind of factory farming to replace and therefore use it to change humanityās value (it might be hard to believe now, but I am afraid the other uses could have huge economic potentials). But since we now agree that we can use alt-pro to replace 80% of FFFF, and then do moral/ālegal advocacy from there, maybe we still have a realistic chance to make the elimination of FFFF a moral change.
Thanks for writing this up! I disagree for a few reasons:
This feels more like a problem at the point between āalternative proteins have scaled up and weāve replaced a bunch of meatā and āthis results in a meat ban.ā It seems possible to me that moral advocacy efforts can happen after alternative proteins have scaled up, but before there are laws to stop factory farming for food entirely. I donāt think alternative proteins replacing, say, 80% of meat will result in people thinking non-meat uses of animals is morally okay in a lock-in kind of way.
I think a lot of peopleās moral reasoning about animals is posthoc/ābased on cognitive dissonance. That is, people like eating meat, or itās a valuable part of their culture, and their moral intuitions around animal exploitation are built around that. So it seems plausible to me that moral advocacy efforts become substantially more effective if weāre able to quickly replace one of the biggest uses of animals.
Iām not sure Iām compelled by the mechanism for lock-in. One mechanism appears to be overconfidence/ācomplacency as a society, which reduces the drive toward moral progress. This seems somewhat plausible, but it feels like this is possible to solve (for instance, animal advocacy organizations pivot toward other uses of animals, and are more able to dedicate resources focused on animal advocacy). Another mechanism seems to be that āletting automobiles replace horses as practical transport instead of listening to the horse advocates and becoming better humans, humanity has lost a great opportunity to do something for the animals for moral reasons, and do so by accepting an economic loss.ā But I guess Iām not sure why ā in either the horse case or the factory farming case ā this is a unique opportunity. I donāt think the existence of factory farming necessarily strengthens the argument, to an average person, about the urgency of animal advocacy, because if people donāt buy the moral reasoning for caring about animals, Iām not sure the scale of suffering that exists currently affects whether they buy the moral reasoning. So in the case of horses, for example, I donāt think it was easier to convince people that horses matter before they were replaced as practical transport.
I feel like this is just intractable. Meat has the advantage of being embedded in culture and identity for generations. Without proposing any alternative, and going entirely through the moral route, means going up against this generational idea that eating meat is okay. Success seems hard. Iām wary of taking such a risk, when thereās also the possibility of factory farming for food persisting into the future (and Iād guess, in business-as-usual scenarios, it remains a bigger problem than other kinds of factory farming). I will also say Iām not convinced that expanding our moral circle to animals helps expand our moral circle to things like digital minds in the far future, though thatās a conversation for another day.
Iām uncomfortable about this argument for nonconsequentialist reasons. If factory farming is a grave injustice that ought be abolished (even if youāre a consequentialist who buys moral uncertainty), it seems like letting it stay for much longer and taking a huge risk that it stays forever because you want to do it for the right reasons could be a massive negligent injustice in itself. It feels like, in a moral way, saying āitās bad to hire more beat cops to deter crime, because deterring crime through fear doesnāt convince anyone that their crime is wrong.ā One reason a lot of people would find that intuitively bad is because it feels like itās instrumentalizing the victims of crime for a dubious future consequence.
Tobias also mentioned this. I am adding this to the counterargument. I wasnāt convinced enough when Tobias mentioned it. But your mention of the 80% (or other points that can count as near success) point is relevant here. It seems hopeful that we can replace 80% of FFFF, and reduce peopleās cognitive dissonance from there.
I agree that without any alternatives the change is hard even for hardcore moral changers, thatās a great point and a great reminder.
Me neither, I am literally throwing my intuitions to be critiqued, hopefully bringing out, or rejecting, a potential crucial consideration.
I agree with this. But my point in the post was that by losing the opportunity to slowly do the horse advocacy, it was kind of a lock-in. And I intuitively think that it is plausible that if automobiles were invented later, and horse advocacy was given time to succeed, maybe factory farming wonāt be born.
And itās relevant to the 80% point. There was virtually no such point for the horses. It happened so quick that the horse advocates have no time to do āposthoc advocacyā.
Interesting. I think I am nudged a bit by your point. (I endorse moral uncertainty).
I agree with Tejasā comment, particularly the second point. As a social psychologist, cognitive dissonance is exactly what I would cite too. Reducing the disparity between attitudes and behaviour by any means (such as increasing plant-based eating for health reasons) leaves the mental space to either learn about moral reasons without the same degree of defensiveness ORāeven better and fairly likely in my opinionāstart adopting moral reasons without even any external influence. At least in western societies, the moral reasons for going vegan are pretty well-known, so motivated reasoning may work in our favour over time. Reducetarians may look at their behaviour and ādecideā subconsciously that it was partially motivated by moral reasons because that makes them feel like a good personā¦ which then encourages them to make further changes on moral grounds.
I find this very interesting! And I tend to agree.Inspired by you, it looks to me that a solution to my worry, if there is a justified worry at all, is to start advocating for a ban on FFFF, when itās nearly (i.e. 80%), but not yet, obsolete. And this view means that we should still try to speed up alt-pro!
Just to be clear, the lock-in I am referring to is losing the only opportunity to use moral reasons to eliminate FFFF. I still hold the view that if alt-pro just suddenly replace FFFF, we will miss on a golden opportunity to replace what might turn out to be the easiest kind of factory farming to replace and therefore use it to change humanityās value (it might be hard to believe now, but I am afraid the other uses could have huge economic potentials). But since we now agree that we can use alt-pro to replace 80% of FFFF, and then do moral/ālegal advocacy from there, maybe we still have a realistic chance to make the elimination of FFFF a moral change.