Obviously, we must be sensitive in covering the topic, especially in which examples are chosen. Some examples will present edge cases, problems where even the greatest moral philosophers in the world will be hard-pressed to conclusively solve. Some may not seem like edge cases to us in particular, but they may to others. Some examples, even single words used for reference, could be philosophical landmines. It would like to avoid such examples as best we can.
I believe good examples are the ones which are the least controversial among everyone, and are failure modes of consequentialist rationalizing in obviously hazardous ways. I read an article about how one anonymous woman in the United States was making money by writing essays for students at American universities with poor English skills. She was making enough money that I speculated, as an adept student of English, it was worth it for me to take up a career of plagiarism to earn to give. I was dumb. Jack LaSota commented I shouldn’t consider it because if I was found out such actions would tarnish effective altruism by association. Months later, in another conversation, someone asked if funneling money into secret Swiss bank accounts to avoid paying taxes so the money could instead be donated to effective charities would be a good idea. Everyone responded ‘uh, no’, but I gave a lengthy and well-received response as to why it was a bad idea.
Justifying crime and fraud are great, uncontroversial examples of things WE TOTALLY SHOULDN’T DO. I think building from like examples is a good starting point, and we can extrapolate to general rationale behind not doing them to get the thesis across.
Obviously, we must be sensitive in covering the topic, especially in which examples are chosen. Some examples will present edge cases, problems where even the greatest moral philosophers in the world will be hard-pressed to conclusively solve. Some may not seem like edge cases to us in particular, but they may to others. Some examples, even single words used for reference, could be philosophical landmines. It would like to avoid such examples as best we can.
I believe good examples are the ones which are the least controversial among everyone, and are failure modes of consequentialist rationalizing in obviously hazardous ways. I read an article about how one anonymous woman in the United States was making money by writing essays for students at American universities with poor English skills. She was making enough money that I speculated, as an adept student of English, it was worth it for me to take up a career of plagiarism to earn to give. I was dumb. Jack LaSota commented I shouldn’t consider it because if I was found out such actions would tarnish effective altruism by association. Months later, in another conversation, someone asked if funneling money into secret Swiss bank accounts to avoid paying taxes so the money could instead be donated to effective charities would be a good idea. Everyone responded ‘uh, no’, but I gave a lengthy and well-received response as to why it was a bad idea.
Justifying crime and fraud are great, uncontroversial examples of things WE TOTALLY SHOULDN’T DO. I think building from like examples is a good starting point, and we can extrapolate to general rationale behind not doing them to get the thesis across.