The great filter example is interesting, actually. For if we’re working in a Bayesian framework, then surely we’d assign such a hypothesis a probability. And then the number of future people could again be vast in expectation.
Yes if you’re happy to let your calculations be driven by very small probabilities of enormous value I suppose you’re right that the great filter would never be conclusive. Whether or not it is reasonable to allow this is an open question in decision theory and I don’t think it’s something that all longtermists accept.
The authors themselves don’t appear to be all that comfortable with accepting it:
All we need is that there be one course of action such that one ought to have a non-minuscule credence in that action’s having non-negligible long-lasting influence
This implies if they think a credence is miniscule or a long-lasting influence negligible that they might throw away the calculation.
Yes if you’re happy to let your calculations be driven by very small probabilities of enormous value I suppose you’re right that the great filter would never be conclusive. Whether or not it is reasonable to allow this is an open question in decision theory and I don’t think it’s something that all longtermists accept.
The authors themselves don’t appear to be all that comfortable with accepting it:
This implies if they think a credence is miniscule or a long-lasting influence negligible that they might throw away the calculation.