By looking at this picture, you can see that we’re pretty certain that humans are conscious and very certain that ELIZA is not conscious. We’re uncertain about whether chickens and 2024 LLMs are conscious.
These conclusions only hold for a prior probability of consciousness of 1⁄6. I think this prior is very arbitrary. So I believe the results for the (posterior) probability of consciousness are also very arbitrary.
We are pretty certain about how uncertain we are about whether 2024 LLMs are conscious (we think there’s about a 10% chance they’re conscious). But we’re not only uncertain about whether chickens are conscious, we’re very uncertain about how uncertain we are about whether chickens are conscious.
The model underestimates the uncertainty of the distributions of the probability of consciousness. The weights of the stances are set to point estimates. However, Figure 7 of the report shows the 13 experts surveyed were very uncertain about the weights. I would set the weights of the stances to very wide distributions to represent the very high model uncertainty.
Hi Ozy.
These conclusions only hold for a prior probability of consciousness of 1⁄6. I think this prior is very arbitrary. So I believe the results for the (posterior) probability of consciousness are also very arbitrary.
The model underestimates the uncertainty of the distributions of the probability of consciousness. The weights of the stances are set to point estimates. However, Figure 7 of the report shows the 13 experts surveyed were very uncertain about the weights. I would set the weights of the stances to very wide distributions to represent the very high model uncertainty.