Executive summary: Longtermist modeling of existential risk reduction relies on several sensitive assumptions that, when examined critically, may significantly reduce the estimated value of such interventions.
Key points:
Higher baseline existential risk decreases the value of risk reduction efforts.
Projected population decline reduces the number of future lives potentially saved.
Intervention decay over time diminishes long-term impact of current efforts.
Suffering risks (S-risks) could potentially outweigh benefits of existential risk reduction.
The “time of perils” hypothesis attempts to address some critiques but requires strong assumptions.
Hedonic lotteries (potential massive wellbeing improvements) may counterbalance S-risks.
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Executive summary: Longtermist modeling of existential risk reduction relies on several sensitive assumptions that, when examined critically, may significantly reduce the estimated value of such interventions.
Key points:
Higher baseline existential risk decreases the value of risk reduction efforts.
Projected population decline reduces the number of future lives potentially saved.
Intervention decay over time diminishes long-term impact of current efforts.
Suffering risks (S-risks) could potentially outweigh benefits of existential risk reduction.
The “time of perils” hypothesis attempts to address some critiques but requires strong assumptions.
Hedonic lotteries (potential massive wellbeing improvements) may counterbalance S-risks.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.