A. Does that mean that, under a symmetric person-affecting Epicurean view, it’s not bad if a person brings into existence someone who’s highly likely to have a life filled with extreme suffering? Do you find this plausible?
B. Does that also mean that, under a symmetric person-affecting Epicurean view, there’s no benefit from allowing a person who is currently enduring extreme suffering to terminate their life? Do you find this plausible?
C. Let’s say a person holds the following views:
It is good to increase the well-being of currently existing people and to decrease the suffering of currently existing people.
It is good to increase the well-being of future people who will necessarily exist and to decrease the suffering of future people who will necessarily exist. (I’m using necessarily exist in a broad sense that sets aside the non-identity problem.)
It’s neither good nor bad to cause a person with a net positive life to come into existence or to cause a currently existing person who would live net positively for the rest of their life to stay alive.
It’s bad to cause a person who would live a net negative life to come into existence and to cause a currently existing person who would live net negatively for the rest of their life to stay alive.
Does this qualify as an Epicurean view? If not, is there a name for such a view?
Very late reply, but the first parts of 3 and 4 together are the procreation asymmetry, which together lead to antinatalism (it’s better for individuals not to be born, ignoring other effects) unless you accept sufficiently low risks of bad lives, and adding the second parts of each leads to promortalism (it’s better for people to die painlessly as soon as possible, ignoring other effects) unless you accept sufficiently low risks of bad lives.
If you accept 2 (the non-identity problem) and believe adding people with good lives is never good in itself, that leads to antinatalism regardless of uncertainty for any life that isn’t maximally good, or you need to reject the independence of irrelevant alternatives (or transitivity) as in this paper.
The argument with the independence of irrelevant alternatives is that for any hypothetical individual A without maximal welfare, there is some hypothetical individual B (the same individual or a different individual) with higher welfare, so by 2, it’s strictly better for B to come to exist than A, but since, by 3, it’s never good in itself to bring a new individual into existence, then B coming to exist is at best neutral, and since A is strictly worse than B, then (by transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives) A coming to exist is bad in itself, which would contradict the “nor bad” from “It’s neither good nor bad to cause a person with a net positive life to come into existence”.
The same argument can be made about existing people with respect to death using 1 and the second part of 3 (and transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives), leading to promortalism.
That being said, I wouldn’t guess that it’s uncommon for those defending person-affecting views to reject the independence of irrelevant alternatives. But if you do accept it, then I think the four statements together are best described as promortalism (if you omit the “nor bad” from 3, otherwise they are inconsistent).
A. Does that mean that, under a symmetric person-affecting Epicurean view, it’s not bad if a person brings into existence someone who’s highly likely to have a life filled with extreme suffering? Do you find this plausible?
B. Does that also mean that, under a symmetric person-affecting Epicurean view, there’s no benefit from allowing a person who is currently enduring extreme suffering to terminate their life? Do you find this plausible?
C. Let’s say a person holds the following views:
It is good to increase the well-being of currently existing people and to decrease the suffering of currently existing people.
It is good to increase the well-being of future people who will necessarily exist and to decrease the suffering of future people who will necessarily exist. (I’m using necessarily exist in a broad sense that sets aside the non-identity problem.)
It’s neither good nor bad to cause a person with a net positive life to come into existence or to cause a currently existing person who would live net positively for the rest of their life to stay alive.
It’s bad to cause a person who would live a net negative life to come into existence and to cause a currently existing person who would live net negatively for the rest of their life to stay alive.
Does this qualify as an Epicurean view? If not, is there a name for such a view?
Very late reply, but the first parts of 3 and 4 together are the procreation asymmetry, which together lead to antinatalism (it’s better for individuals not to be born, ignoring other effects) unless you accept sufficiently low risks of bad lives, and adding the second parts of each leads to promortalism (it’s better for people to die painlessly as soon as possible, ignoring other effects) unless you accept sufficiently low risks of bad lives.
If you accept 2 (the non-identity problem) and believe adding people with good lives is never good in itself, that leads to antinatalism regardless of uncertainty for any life that isn’t maximally good, or you need to reject the independence of irrelevant alternatives (or transitivity) as in this paper.
The argument with the independence of irrelevant alternatives is that for any hypothetical individual A without maximal welfare, there is some hypothetical individual B (the same individual or a different individual) with higher welfare, so by 2, it’s strictly better for B to come to exist than A, but since, by 3, it’s never good in itself to bring a new individual into existence, then B coming to exist is at best neutral, and since A is strictly worse than B, then (by transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives) A coming to exist is bad in itself, which would contradict the “nor bad” from “It’s neither good nor bad to cause a person with a net positive life to come into existence”.
The same argument can be made about existing people with respect to death using 1 and the second part of 3 (and transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives), leading to promortalism.
That being said, I wouldn’t guess that it’s uncommon for those defending person-affecting views to reject the independence of irrelevant alternatives. But if you do accept it, then I think the four statements together are best described as promortalism (if you omit the “nor bad” from 3, otherwise they are inconsistent).