Is automaximization not an objection to desire theories as well? Or should we accept that we don’t get to decide all of our desires or how easy it is to satisfy them?
Is automaximization not an objection to desire theories as well?
As I state above, the first point in the paper is that life satisfaction theories seem to be a particular kind of desire theory, the global desire theory, in disguise. Hence, the two objection I raise are objections to both life satisfaction and global desire theories (which I claim are really just the same view). The two objections won’t apply to non-global desire theories; as I say in the paper, that might be reason for people who like desire theories to instead adopt a non-global version.
Or should we accept that we don’t get to decide all of our desires or how easy it is to satisfy them?
It’s clear we don’t get to decide on many of our desires! We simply have urges to do all sorts of things. See distinction in the paper between local vs global desires.
Ah, I think I was unclear or confused with my first comment (using the wrong quantifier).
If it’s absurd that you can maximize your own well-being just by deciding that it’s going well, it doesn’t seem much less absurd that you can improve your well-being just by deciding that it’s going better. Global desires (and life satisfaction) are still desires, and would be (I think) by default counted in local desire theories, but if global desires lead to absurd conclusions, maybe they shouldn’t be counted at all in any theory. If there’s no satisfactory way to exclude them from desire theories, then this seems like an argument against desire theories in general.
And then maybe we shouldn’t get to decide any of our desires or how well they’re satisfied.
Addiction: I shall inject you with an addictive drug. From now on, you will wake each morning with an extremely strong desire to have another injection of this drug. Having this desire will be in itself neither pleasant nor painful, but if the desire is not fulfilled within an hour it will then become very painful. This is no cause for concern, since I shall give you ample supplies of this drug. Every morning, you will be able at once to fulfil this desire. The injection, and its after‐effects, would also be neither pleasant nor painful. You will spend the rest of your days as you do now.
A local desire theory, where only local desire counts is, in fact, objectivist—it will claim that I am better off in Addiction even if I strenuously protest that it’s my life and I don’t think that I’m better off.
(Personally, though, I don’t think creating a desire and satisfying it makes an individual better off on the basis of that desire, assuming a desire theory. I think antifrustrationism and preference-affecting views or mixtures of them are far more plausible. More on this here.)
Is automaximization not an objection to desire theories as well? Or should we accept that we don’t get to decide all of our desires or how easy it is to satisfy them?
As I state above, the first point in the paper is that life satisfaction theories seem to be a particular kind of desire theory, the global desire theory, in disguise. Hence, the two objection I raise are objections to both life satisfaction and global desire theories (which I claim are really just the same view). The two objections won’t apply to non-global desire theories; as I say in the paper, that might be reason for people who like desire theories to instead adopt a non-global version.
It’s clear we don’t get to decide on many of our desires! We simply have urges to do all sorts of things. See distinction in the paper between local vs global desires.
Ah, I think I was unclear or confused with my first comment (using the wrong quantifier).
If it’s absurd that you can maximize your own well-being just by deciding that it’s going well, it doesn’t seem much less absurd that you can improve your well-being just by deciding that it’s going better. Global desires (and life satisfaction) are still desires, and would be (I think) by default counted in local desire theories, but if global desires lead to absurd conclusions, maybe they shouldn’t be counted at all in any theory. If there’s no satisfactory way to exclude them from desire theories, then this seems like an argument against desire theories in general.
And then maybe we shouldn’t get to decide any of our desires or how well they’re satisfied.
Ah, from the paper:
(Personally, though, I don’t think creating a desire and satisfying it makes an individual better off on the basis of that desire, assuming a desire theory. I think antifrustrationism and preference-affecting views or mixtures of them are far more plausible. More on this here.)