Moreover, I take it that there is very little credibility to the opposite view, that we should regard the inverse of the above claims as disproportionately likely by default. So if you give some (higher-order) credence to views or models implying cluelessness, and some to views on which we can often reasonably expect commonsensically good things to be long-term good, then it seems the positive expectations could trivially win out
I don’t think this works, at least at the level of our empirical credences, for reasons I argue here. (I think the crux here is the “insensitivity to mild sweetening” of imprecise expectations / incomplete preferences; more on that here.)
I do think what you say might work as a response to the precise Bayesian epistemic diffusion model, to be clear, but that’s not the strongest case for cluelessness.
I don’t think this works, at least at the level of our empirical credences, for reasons I argue here. (I think the crux here is the “insensitivity to mild sweetening” of imprecise expectations / incomplete preferences; more on that here.)
I do think what you say might work as a response to the precise Bayesian epistemic diffusion model, to be clear, but that’s not the strongest case for cluelessness.