Iām far from an expert on contractualism, but iirc itās standardly presented as a theory of just one part of morality, which Scanlon characterizes as āwhat we owe to each otherā. Do many regard it as a serious contender for what we all things considered ought to do? (The exclusion of animal interests, for example, would seem to make this implausible. But the implicit disregard for overall value also strikes me as entirely disqualifying. If I became convinced that contractualism were the true account of āmoralityā, I would probably also become an amoralist of a sort, because other things just strike me as vastly more objectively important than āwhat we owe to each otherā.)
Edit: just saw footnote 4 (initially hidden) relates to this point. You say, āIf we owe it to others to favor GHW-like interventions over x-risk interventions, then thatās enough for practical purposes.ā I guess Iām questioning that. Surely whatās practically relevant is what we all things considered ought to do.
Fair enough re: the view that contractualism is just one part of morality. I suppose that the contractualist has two obvious maneuvers here. One of them is to reject this assumption and take what we owe one another to be all of morality. Another is to say that what we owe one another is sensitive to the rest of morality and, for that reason, itās appropriate to have what we owe one another trump other moral considerations in our practical deliberations. Either way, if we owe it to the global poor to prioritize their interests, itās what we ought to do all things considered.
FWIW, given my own uncertainties about normative theory, I care more about the titular conditional (If contractualism, then AMF) than anything else here.
Iām far from an expert on contractualism, but iirc itās standardly presented as a theory of just one part of morality, which Scanlon characterizes as āwhat we owe to each otherā. Do many regard it as a serious contender for what we all things considered ought to do? (The exclusion of animal interests, for example, would seem to make this implausible. But the implicit disregard for overall value also strikes me as entirely disqualifying. If I became convinced that contractualism were the true account of āmoralityā, I would probably also become an amoralist of a sort, because other things just strike me as vastly more objectively important than āwhat we owe to each otherā.)
Edit: just saw footnote 4 (initially hidden) relates to this point. You say, āIf we owe it to others to favor GHW-like interventions over x-risk interventions, then thatās enough for practical purposes.ā I guess Iām questioning that. Surely whatās practically relevant is what we all things considered ought to do.
Fair enough re: the view that contractualism is just one part of morality. I suppose that the contractualist has two obvious maneuvers here. One of them is to reject this assumption and take what we owe one another to be all of morality. Another is to say that what we owe one another is sensitive to the rest of morality and, for that reason, itās appropriate to have what we owe one another trump other moral considerations in our practical deliberations. Either way, if we owe it to the global poor to prioritize their interests, itās what we ought to do all things considered.
FWIW, given my own uncertainties about normative theory, I care more about the titular conditional (If contractualism, then AMF) than anything else here.