It’s not that there aren’t similarly complex reverses, it’s that there’s a type of bad that basically everyone agrees can be extremely bad, i.e. extreme suffering, and there’s no (or much less) consensus on a good with similar complexity and that can be as good as extreme suffering is bad. For example, many would discount pleasure/joy on the basis of false beliefs, like being happy that your partner loves you when they actually don’t, whether because they just happen not to love you and are deceiving you, or because they’re a simulation with no feelings at all. Extreme suffering wouldn’t get discounted (much) if it were based on inaccurate beliefs.
A torturous solipsistic experience machine is very bad, but a happy solipsistic experience machine might not be very good at all, if people’s desires aren’t actually being satisfied and they’re only deceived into believing they are.
It’s not that there aren’t similarly complex reverses, it’s that there’s a type of bad that basically everyone agrees can be extremely bad, i.e. extreme suffering, and there’s no (or much less) consensus on a good with similar complexity and that can be as good as extreme suffering is bad. For example, many would discount pleasure/joy on the basis of false beliefs, like being happy that your partner loves you when they actually don’t, whether because they just happen not to love you and are deceiving you, or because they’re a simulation with no feelings at all. Extreme suffering wouldn’t get discounted (much) if it were based on inaccurate beliefs.
A torturous solipsistic experience machine is very bad, but a happy solipsistic experience machine might not be very good at all, if people’s desires aren’t actually being satisfied and they’re only deceived into believing they are.