Another argument for asymmetric preference views (including antifrustrationism) and preference-affecting views over total symmetric preference views is that the total symmetric views are actually pretty intrapersonally alienating or illiberal in principle, and possibly in practice in the future with more advanced tech or when we can reprogram artificially conscious beings.
Do you care a lot about your family or other goals? Nope! I can make you care and approve way more about having a green cube and your new life centered on green cubes, abandoning your family and goals. You’ll be way better off. Even if you disprefer the prospect now, I’ll make sure you’ll be way more grateful after with your new preferences. The gain will outweigh the loss.
Basically, if you can manipulate someone’s mind to have additional preferences that you ensure are satisfied, as long as the extra satisfaction exceeds the frustration from involuntarily manipulating them, it’s better for them than leaving them alone.
Asymmetric and preference-affecting views seem much less vulnerable to this, as long as we count as bad the frustration involved in manipulating or eliminating preferences, including preferences against certain kinds of manipulation and elimination. For example, killing someone in their sleep and therefore eliminating all their preferences has to still typically be bad for someone who would disprefer it, even if they don’t find out. The killing both frustrates and eliminates their preferences basically simultaneously, but we assume the frustration is still bad. And new satisfied preferences wouldn’t make up for the frustration on these views.
This is the problem of replacement/replaceability, applied intrapersonally to preferences and desires.
Another argument for asymmetric preference views (including antifrustrationism) and preference-affecting views over total symmetric preference views is that the total symmetric views are actually pretty intrapersonally alienating or illiberal in principle, and possibly in practice in the future with more advanced tech or when we can reprogram artificially conscious beings.
Do you care a lot about your family or other goals? Nope! I can make you care and approve way more about having a green cube and your new life centered on green cubes, abandoning your family and goals. You’ll be way better off. Even if you disprefer the prospect now, I’ll make sure you’ll be way more grateful after with your new preferences. The gain will outweigh the loss.
Basically, if you can manipulate someone’s mind to have additional preferences that you ensure are satisfied, as long as the extra satisfaction exceeds the frustration from involuntarily manipulating them, it’s better for them than leaving them alone.
Asymmetric and preference-affecting views seem much less vulnerable to this, as long as we count as bad the frustration involved in manipulating or eliminating preferences, including preferences against certain kinds of manipulation and elimination. For example, killing someone in their sleep and therefore eliminating all their preferences has to still typically be bad for someone who would disprefer it, even if they don’t find out. The killing both frustrates and eliminates their preferences basically simultaneously, but we assume the frustration is still bad. And new satisfied preferences wouldn’t make up for the frustration on these views.
This is the problem of replacement/replaceability, applied intrapersonally to preferences and desires.