TL;DR of the below post is that I agree with the brief remarks about 1.5 Track Dialogues made in the Founders Pledge document you cite at f/n 68.
I’d like to cheerlead briefly for a diversity of channels. That is, sometimes we’ll see countries put a public freeze on one another where the most senior and high-profile figures (presidents, prime ministers, foreign affairs ministers etc) don’t talk to each other for reasons of posturing over an issue.
In countries where there isn’t a diversity of channels (by which I mean, most interactions occur between those most senior officials and a formal diplomatic channel), this can create risky situations because there’s no longer a way to clarify (that is, communications become indirect via the oblique public statements, and prone to cross-cultural and other confusion). “Hotlines” are less relevant in this situation because the point of the posturing is that the countries aren’t talking to one another. Picking up the hotline would be off-message.
What reduces risk in that situation is a diversity of channels. The post discussed diplomatic channels, and I won’t repeat that. We also often think about a ‘back channel’ in the sense of a confidant of one leader talking to a confidant of another leader—a proxy conversation that allows the posturing to continue but some more direct communication to occur. And that can help (appreciating the clarity and timeliness points made in your post).
The key thing I’d add to that point (in support of the points raised about track 2) is at-level connections within a bureaucracy (and to a lesser extent people-to-people connections). That is, where lots of officials in a country know their counterpart in the other country, a formal diplomatic freeze is of much less practical concern because the bulk of all those at-level communications means each country remains pretty much in tune with what the other is doing (there isn’t likely to be a spiral of miscommunication because, when the president says X in a public forum, mid-level officials will be saying to other mid-level officials “oh, when the President said X what s/he really meant was 1, 2, 3 not a, b,c ”). Obviously that’s helpful outside of the ‘freeze’ scenario as well.
One of the reasons I think this perspective is relevant to EAs is because it is tractable. A philanthropist might struggle to get a “hotline” built between countries X and Y. However, it is explicitly open to an EA NGO to establish a 1.5 track dialogue (or similar concept) that seeks to get together sets of officials in a way that’s focused on building relationships and interpersonal connections (I don’t even think it needs to be issue-specific in the way this post suggests).
For the benefit of readers, the PF document in the f/n says:
[W]e recommend Track II and Track 1.5 diplomacy programs. This intervention stands out because it has (i) a strong theoretical case for effectiveness, (ii) some supportive empirical evidence and support from experts, (iii) seemingly high upside and minimal downside risk.
TL;DR of the below post is that I agree with the brief remarks about 1.5 Track Dialogues made in the Founders Pledge document you cite at f/n 68.
I’d like to cheerlead briefly for a diversity of channels. That is, sometimes we’ll see countries put a public freeze on one another where the most senior and high-profile figures (presidents, prime ministers, foreign affairs ministers etc) don’t talk to each other for reasons of posturing over an issue.
In countries where there isn’t a diversity of channels (by which I mean, most interactions occur between those most senior officials and a formal diplomatic channel), this can create risky situations because there’s no longer a way to clarify (that is, communications become indirect via the oblique public statements, and prone to cross-cultural and other confusion). “Hotlines” are less relevant in this situation because the point of the posturing is that the countries aren’t talking to one another. Picking up the hotline would be off-message.
What reduces risk in that situation is a diversity of channels. The post discussed diplomatic channels, and I won’t repeat that. We also often think about a ‘back channel’ in the sense of a confidant of one leader talking to a confidant of another leader—a proxy conversation that allows the posturing to continue but some more direct communication to occur. And that can help (appreciating the clarity and timeliness points made in your post).
The key thing I’d add to that point (in support of the points raised about track 2) is at-level connections within a bureaucracy (and to a lesser extent people-to-people connections). That is, where lots of officials in a country know their counterpart in the other country, a formal diplomatic freeze is of much less practical concern because the bulk of all those at-level communications means each country remains pretty much in tune with what the other is doing (there isn’t likely to be a spiral of miscommunication because, when the president says X in a public forum, mid-level officials will be saying to other mid-level officials “oh, when the President said X what s/he really meant was 1, 2, 3 not a, b,c ”). Obviously that’s helpful outside of the ‘freeze’ scenario as well.
One of the reasons I think this perspective is relevant to EAs is because it is tractable. A philanthropist might struggle to get a “hotline” built between countries X and Y. However, it is explicitly open to an EA NGO to establish a 1.5 track dialogue (or similar concept) that seeks to get together sets of officials in a way that’s focused on building relationships and interpersonal connections (I don’t even think it needs to be issue-specific in the way this post suggests).
For the benefit of readers, the PF document in the f/n says:
[W]e recommend Track II and Track 1.5 diplomacy programs. This intervention stands out because it has (i) a strong theoretical case for effectiveness, (ii) some supportive empirical evidence and support from experts, (iii) seemingly high upside and minimal downside risk.