FWIW, while I didnât downvote the comment, I can see how folks would consider âWhy stop at X?â a lazy âgotchaâ argument or appeal to absurdity heuristic, which seems worth discouraging.
If yes: Guess what? I am a sorcerer from a parallel universe who has the ability to conjure arbitrary numbers of sentient beings into existence at will, and subject them to extreme torture. You tell me how unlikely you think this claim is. I will then threaten 10x the reciprocal of that number, unless you give me ÂŁ100. I can send you my details and we can arrange the transfer.
If no: How do you explain this other than by an appeal to absurdity? I would love to know the solution to this problem.
Unless or until we have a better solution to this problem than âthatâs absurdâ, then I think we have to allow appeals to absurdity, especially when used against an argument that bears some resemblance to this pascal mugger example, at least superficially.
Haha, ok, fair enough, I was not expecting that response!
Your solution (and Karnofskyâs) sound very interesting to me. But Iâll need to read both links in more depth to properly wrap my head around it.
A few questions though:
Karnofskyâs worked example for applying their multi-model technique leads with: âdoes this action deviate greatly from ânormality?ââ Why is this not just a more formalized version of the appeal to absurdity heuristic?
Not everyone is a galaxy-brain philosopher who can come up with complex blogposts like those to explain why giving their wallet to a Pascal mugger is wrong, yet everyone gets the correct (presumably) answer to this thought experiment anyway. And I think most are getting there by using some kind of absurdity heuristic? I think that should count in favour of the usefulness of the appeal to absurdity heuristic! Really feels like thereâs a good galaxy-brain meme in this. (I get Iâm rolling back here on my early suggestion that we could abandon the absurdity heuristic as soon as just one person could come up with a solution to the problem of pascalâs mugger).
Back to the actual subject of this post: Do you think the approach outlined in your 2 links could be used as an argument against the overwhelming importance of insect suffering, at least for someone who was extremely uncertain about the likelihood of insect sentience or its intensity?
Thanks! I unfortunately donât have time to engage fully with this thread going forward, but briefly:
To be clear, I donât share Karnofskyâs overall framework. Iâm skeptical of the âregression to normalityâ criterion myself. (And I donât find his model of the problem behind Pascalâs mugging probabilities compelling, since he still uses precise estimates.)
In the Pascalâs mugging case, I think people have some fuzzy sense that the muggerâs claim is made-up, which can be more carefully operationalized with imprecise credences. But if we canât even point to what our âthis is absurdâ reaction is about, and are instead merely asserting that our pretheoretic sense should dictate our decisions, Iâm more skeptical. Especially when weâre embracing an ethical principle most people would consider absurd (impartial altruism).
Appeal to absurdity is a reasonable objection and shouldnât be discouraged. We need to be able to say clearly why idea X doesnât also imply some similar absurd idea Y.
FWIW, while I didnât downvote the comment, I can see how folks would consider âWhy stop at X?â a lazy âgotchaâ argument or appeal to absurdity heuristic, which seems worth discouraging.
Would you give your wallet to a pascal mugger?
If yes: Guess what? I am a sorcerer from a parallel universe who has the ability to conjure arbitrary numbers of sentient beings into existence at will, and subject them to extreme torture. You tell me how unlikely you think this claim is. I will then threaten 10x the reciprocal of that number, unless you give me ÂŁ100. I can send you my details and we can arrange the transfer.
If no: How do you explain this other than by an appeal to absurdity? I would love to know the solution to this problem.
Unless or until we have a better solution to this problem than âthatâs absurdâ, then I think we have to allow appeals to absurdity, especially when used against an argument that bears some resemblance to this pascal mugger example, at least superficially.
I happen to have a response here that doesnât appeal to absurdity. :) (Cf. Karnofsky here.)
Haha, ok, fair enough, I was not expecting that response!
Your solution (and Karnofskyâs) sound very interesting to me. But Iâll need to read both links in more depth to properly wrap my head around it.
A few questions though:
Karnofskyâs worked example for applying their multi-model technique leads with: âdoes this action deviate greatly from ânormality?ââ Why is this not just a more formalized version of the appeal to absurdity heuristic?
Not everyone is a galaxy-brain philosopher who can come up with complex blogposts like those to explain why giving their wallet to a Pascal mugger is wrong, yet everyone gets the correct (presumably) answer to this thought experiment anyway. And I think most are getting there by using some kind of absurdity heuristic? I think that should count in favour of the usefulness of the appeal to absurdity heuristic! Really feels like thereâs a good galaxy-brain meme in this. (I get Iâm rolling back here on my early suggestion that we could abandon the absurdity heuristic as soon as just one person could come up with a solution to the problem of pascalâs mugger).
Back to the actual subject of this post: Do you think the approach outlined in your 2 links could be used as an argument against the overwhelming importance of insect suffering, at least for someone who was extremely uncertain about the likelihood of insect sentience or its intensity?
Thanks! I unfortunately donât have time to engage fully with this thread going forward, but briefly:
To be clear, I donât share Karnofskyâs overall framework. Iâm skeptical of the âregression to normalityâ criterion myself. (And I donât find his model of the problem behind Pascalâs mugging probabilities compelling, since he still uses precise estimates.)
In the Pascalâs mugging case, I think people have some fuzzy sense that the muggerâs claim is made-up, which can be more carefully operationalized with imprecise credences. But if we canât even point to what our âthis is absurdâ reaction is about, and are instead merely asserting that our pretheoretic sense should dictate our decisions, Iâm more skeptical. Especially when weâre embracing an ethical principle most people would consider absurd (impartial altruism).
Appeal to absurdity is a reasonable objection and shouldnât be discouraged. We need to be able to say clearly why idea X doesnât also imply some similar absurd idea Y.