I was interested to see the suggestion that rational discussions of value are cut short by the is-ought gap. This has been an influential view but I have a different angle.
We should acknowledge that normative judgements have a different semantic nature from the factual. When we use normative words such as ‘ought’ and ‘good’ we make judgements relative to ends or other criteria. Factual judgements report on facts in the world, normative judgements report on relations between objects and criteria. Judgements of practical reason, of how we ought to act, are about our means and our ends.
But we can and do reason about both means and ends. Judgements of practical reason range from the certain ‘You ought to turn right to get to the station’ to the unknowable ‘Ought I to take this job for my long-run happiness?’ There are better and worse ends—welfare is clearly more important than grass-counting and there are strong arguments why welfare is a better end than national glory.
Among ends, happiness seems to have a special place. We are creatures with valenced experience and we are directly aware that our own enjoyment is good and our suffering is bad. Reason seems to require us to expand the circle to also consider the enjoyment and suffering of other creatures. If nothing else, extremes of enjoyment and suffering surely matter.
I was interested to see the suggestion that rational discussions of value are cut short by the is-ought gap. This has been an influential view but I have a different angle.
We should acknowledge that normative judgements have a different semantic nature from the factual. When we use normative words such as ‘ought’ and ‘good’ we make judgements relative to ends or other criteria. Factual judgements report on facts in the world, normative judgements report on relations between objects and criteria. Judgements of practical reason, of how we ought to act, are about our means and our ends.
But we can and do reason about both means and ends. Judgements of practical reason range from the certain ‘You ought to turn right to get to the station’ to the unknowable ‘Ought I to take this job for my long-run happiness?’ There are better and worse ends—welfare is clearly more important than grass-counting and there are strong arguments why welfare is a better end than national glory.
Among ends, happiness seems to have a special place. We are creatures with valenced experience and we are directly aware that our own enjoyment is good and our suffering is bad. Reason seems to require us to expand the circle to also consider the enjoyment and suffering of other creatures. If nothing else, extremes of enjoyment and suffering surely matter.